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INTRODUCTION

Throughout most of the 20th Century, the Mafia frustrated federal
prosecutors. The law did not aid law enforcement in prosecuting large
criminal enterprises. Before the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations Act (RIC0),1 prosecuting organized crime was "an
awkward affair. " 2 The government's efforts in law enforcement and
criminal prosecutions were ineffectual against sophisticated crime
circles. 3 When organized crime leaders were apprehended, the
government often charged them for what seemed to be insignificant
offenses. The larger meaning of these offenses was not exposed in
court under common law evidentiary standards and procedural rules.
As a result, courtroom drama never exposed the overarching picture of
organized crime.
Congress enacted the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations Act (RICO) as part of a comprehensive effort to change
the means by which the government attacked organized crime. 4 RICO's
•Deputy Prosecuting Attorney, Elkhart County, Indiana; Notre Dame Law School, J.D.
2006; Northern Arizona University, B.S. 2003. For invaluable comments, suggestions, and
inspiration, thanks to Amber Pezan, John Gunnigle, and especially Prof. G. Robert Blakey.
1. Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) Act, 18 U.S.C. § 19611968 (2001), amended by U.S.A. Patriot Act, tit. VIII,§ 813, 115 Stat. 272 (Oct. 26, 2001).
2. Effectiveness of the Government's Attack on La Cosa Nostra: Before the Permanent
Subcomm. on Investigations Comm. On Governmental Affairs, 1OOth Cong. 14 (1988)
(statement of David C. Williams, Director, Office of Special Investigations) [hereinafter
Investigations Comm. on Governmental Affairs]; see e.g., Accardo v. Comm'r, 942 F.2d
444 (7th Cir. 1991) (affirming the conviction of Anthony Accardo, a Chicago mob Boss, for
tax evasion in the reporting of his criminal defense legal fees). For a complete accounting
of Accordo's criminal record, which at his death included 27 arrests, but only the one,
seemingly insignificant tax conviction, see Susan B. Bodell, Comment, Catching "Big
Tuna": How the Seventh Circuit Finally Reeled in Anthony Accardo, 47 U. MIAMI L. REV.
1061 (1993).
3. Investigations Comm. on Governmental Affairs, supra note 2, at 14; see also United
States v. Bonanno Organized Crime Family, 683 F.Supp. 1411, 1445 (E.D.N.Y. 1988)
(proposing that the problem was compounded because "conviction and imprisonment of the
perpetrators or organized crime were not sufficient to deter or curtail organized criminal
activities since the incarcerated individuals were merely replaced with other members of the
criminal enterprise while the economic base of the enterprise remained untouched.").
4. See G. Robert Blakey, The RICO Civil Fraud Action in Context: Reflections on
Bennett v. Berg, 58 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 237, 249-80 (1982); see also G. Robert Blakey &
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focus on "enterprise" criminality makes a single trial of all "siblings" in
a crime "family" possible and appropriate. It forces a judge and jury to
understand exactly what the defendants have done, in a way that the
common law procedural and evidentiary rules did not.
The success of RICO makes it an appealing model for other
nations' legislation. In 2004, when the U.K. proposed law enforcement
reforms with respect to organized crime, it looked to RICO. Its
evaluation of the statute is largely innocent of the procedural and
evidentiary considerations involved in effective prosecution of
organized crime.
This Article examines how RICO's substantive elements, namely
"enterprise," "pattern," and "racketeering activity," shift the balance of
power in a criminal prosecution by altering the application of
procedural and evidentiary rules. Part I reviews the relevant procedural
and evidentiary rules, as they existed before RICO and the advent of the
"enterprise trial." Part II introduces RICO and examines how it
changed the application of these rules, with particular focus on the law
of joinder of offenses and offenders. Part III examines the law of
joinder and severance in the U .K. where the primary paradigm for a trial
is a lone defendant answering for a single offence. Part IV uses the
recent U.K. ricin trial as a case study, demonstrating the need for a
substantive offense to tie together loose-knit conspiracies and more
effectively prosecute enterprise criminality like organized crime and
terrorism. Finally, this Article concludes that RICO is successful partly
because its substantive elements, namely "pattern," "enterprise," and
"racketeering activity" interact with the procedural law to facilitate
joinder of offenses and offenders. This Article suggests that our
common law neighbors have missed an opportunity by failing to modify
the structure of trials as part of the comprehensive criminal reform
program.
I.

JOINDER AND SEVERANCE BEFORE

RICO

In order to understand the effect of the RICO revolution, it is first
necessary to explore the American common law approaches to joinder
of offenses and offenders before the advent of the criminal "enterprise
trial."

Kevin P. Roddy , Reflections on Reves v. Ernst & Young: Its Meaning and Impact on
Substantive, Accessory, Aiding Abetting and Conspiracy Liability Under RICO, 33
AMERICAN CRIM. L. REV. 1345, 1666-75 (1996) (discussing the legislative history
surrounding RICO).
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Historical Approaches to Joinder

Before the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, the American
common law controlled joinder and severance. 5 As a general practice,
common law viewed a criminal trial as one defendant answering for a
single offense. The decision to join offenses and offenders was placed
within the discretionary authority of the judge. 6 In joining offenses, the
judge weighed the utility of trying the offenses together "while
conceding that regularly or usually an indictment should not include
more than one felony. " 7 A judge was not allowed to permit cases where
multiple felonies were not of the same class or grade and subject to the
same punishment. 8 In addition to this rather rigid rule of joinder, the
prosecutor could only join offenses "when it appear[ ed] that they were
so closely connected in respect to time, place, and occasion that it [was]
difficult, if not impossible, to separate the proof of one from proof of
the other."9 Joining two or more offenses is efficient because it
prevents the needless repetition of evidence and witnesses that would
occur if the offenses were tried separately. While efficiency was
valued, judges in the 19th and early 20th Century were apprehensive of
joinder because they feared that defending two counts at the same time
would prejudice a defendant. Io A jury, even when properly instructed,
5. United States v. Marchant, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat) 480 (1827) (holding that defendants
do not have a right to be tried severally and separately). Justice Story, in deciding that
joinder was proper, stated that "[t]he subject is not provided for by any act of Congress; and,
therefore, if the right can be maintained at all, it must be as a right derived from the
[English] common law, which the Courts of the Unites States are bound to recognize and
enforce." Id.
6. Pointer V. United States, 151 U.S. 396, 402 (1894) (quoting ARCHBOLD CRIMINAL
PRACTICE AND PLEADING p.95 c.3 (8th ed.), where the Court states that "if different felonies
or misdemeanors be stated in several counts of an indictment ... the judge, in his discretion,
may require the counsel for the prosecutor to select one of the felonies, and confine himself
to that."
7. Pointer, 151 U.S. at 403. While joinder of the offenses, particularly felonies, was
uncommon, U.S. Rev. Stat. § 1024 (1853) empowered the judge to join indictments of the
same class of felony. In this case, the judge found that two murder charges arising from
murders committed in the same county, with the same instrument (an axe), on the same day,
were properly joined. Id. at 400. See also McElroy v. United States, 164 U.S. 76, 81 (1896)
(holding that it was beyond the judge's discretion to join defendants who had not
participated in the same act or transaction).
8. Pointer, 151 U.S. at 403; United States v. Nye, 4 F. 888 (1880) (finding separate and
distinct felonies could not be joined but did not destroy the validity of the indictment).
9. Pointer, 151 U.S. at 403.
10. Marchant, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat) at 480; cf United States v. Lotsch, 102 F.2d 35, 36
(2d Cir. 1939) (The joining of three charges of receiving commissions from borrowers from
a national bank was within judge's discretion, where evidence as to each was short and
simple); Kidwell v. United States, 38 App. D.C. 566, 570-71 (D.C. Cir. 1912) (improper
joinder is overturned only for abuse of discretion).
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may use the evidence "cumulatively" and convict a defendant who, tried
on one count, would have been acquitted. 11 Thus, there was a strong
preference in the American common law for a simple trial unit. One
offense and one offender remained the paradigm, and joinder was the
exception, not the rule.
A similar rule applied to joining defendants. The American
common law rule was that persons charged in the same indictment
"have not a right by the laws of the country, to be tried severally,
separately, and apart . . . but that such separate trial is a matter to be
allowed in the discretion of the Court before whom the indictment is
tried." 12 Again, the courts favored the simplicity of a smaller trial.
Joinder was restricted to defendants participating in the same offense or
transaction. 13 For example, in McE/roy v. United States, Chief Justice
Fuller ruled that the joinder of five defendants, who appeared to have
formed an arson ring, was improper where all five members were
charged with one arson and only three were charged with a second
arson, which had occurred two weeks later. 14 This joinder was beyond
the court's discretion because it "embarrassed" two of the defendants
and "distracted" the jury. 15 Accordingly, the court reversed and granted
new trials to two of the defendants. 16
11. Lotsch, 102 F .2d at 36. Judge Learned Hand, in deciding that joinder was proper in
the Lotsch case, articulated his concern that "[t]here is indeed always a danger when several
crimes are tried together, that the jury may use the evidence cumulatively; that is, that,
although so much as would be admissible upon any one of the charges might not have
persuaded them of the accused's guilt, the sum of it will convince them as to all." Id. Joint
trials are troubling when "the crimes charged are of such a nature that the jury might regard
one as corroborative of the other, when, in fact, no corroboration exists." Kidwell, 38 App.
D.C. at 570. The criticism of joint trials tends not to speak to the defendant's ability to
defend two charges. Instead, they reveal a general distrust for the jury's ability to
differentiate between defendants and offenses and intelligently apply the law to each. See
e.g. United States v. Dinome, 954 F.2d 839, 842 (2d Cir. 1992) ("The claim that the jury
must have lacked the capacity to understand the instructions given it is thus sheer
speculation.").
12. Marchant, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 480, 486 (1827).
13. McElroy, 164 U.S. at 78 (1896).
14. Id.
15. Id. at 81. The court also noted that:
[I]n cases of felony, the multiplication of distinct charges has been considered so
objectionable as tending to confound the accused in his defence [sic], or to prejudice him as
to his challenges, in the matter of being held out to be habitually criminal, in the distraction
of the attention of the jury, or otherwise, that it is the settled rule in England and in many of
our States, to confine the indictment to one distinct offence or restrict the evidence to one
transaction.
Id. at 80.
16. Id. at 81. Generally, a joint trial could be unwound upon the showing that the
"defendant was embarrassed or confounded in his defense." See also Pointer, 151 U.S. at
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Typically, the law of joinder was not extended beyond its rationale.
Before the Federal Rules, joinder was considered efficient because
evidence against each defendant participating in the same offense would
have been admissible against each defendant in a separate trial. Thus,
joinder prevented the needless and redundant repetition of evidence. 17
If, on the other hand, a trial consisted of diverse defendants and
offenses, joinder was not proper because there would be no substantial
overlap in the evidence against each. 18 The American common law
approach to joinder worked to preserve the traditional paradigm of a
simple trial. The rules of joinder of offenses and offenders limited the
nature of the crimes joined and applied a "transactional" approach to
joining defendants.

B.

Joinder and Severance after the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure, 1946-Present

The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure took effect March 21,
1946. 19 Rules 8 and 14, the rules that allow joinder2° and severance, 21
404.
17. Nestlerode v. United States, 122 F.2d 56, 58 (D.C. Cir. 1941) (holding that a
motion for severance was properly denied where the close relation between the killings here
makes much of the evidence pertinent to both). See also McNeil v. U.S., 85 F.2d 698, 703
(D.C. Cir. 1936) (holding that in a trial for embezzlement and grand larceny, the trial court
was correct in not putting the prosecutor to his election, because proof of one crime
overlapped with proof of the other). See also Lee v. United States, 37 App. D.C. 442, 445
(D.C. Cir. 1911) (holding that the proper joinder requires that the evidence of one of the
crimes would have been admissible in a separate prosecution of the other).
18. See McElroy, 164 U.S. at 78; see also text accompanying notes 13-16.
19. FED. R. CRIM. P. 59. See also Jerold Israel, Federal Influence in State Cases:
Sentencing, Prosecution, and Procedure: Federal Criminal Procedure as a Model for the
States, 543 ANNALS 130, 142 (1996) (The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure were
adopted "at a propitious time." Their predecessor, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
was adopted in 1938, proving to be "a major triumph of law reform."). See also Geoffrey C.
Hazard, Jr., Symposium: The 50th Anniversary of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
1938-1988, V. The Federal Rules Fifty Years Later: Discovery Vices and Trans-Substantive
Virtues in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 2237 (1989) (When the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure came into force eight years later, court rules were still
a recent innovation. They reflect the "then-prevailing view that the 'lawyer's law' of
procedure should be set forth in a systematic fashion-rather than be developed haphazardly
through case law-and should be promulgated by a body insulated from politics and advised
by experts within the legal profession."). See also Israel, supra at 142 (The Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure contain ideas analogous to several Rules of Civil Procedure). Compare
FED. R. CRIM. P. 2 ("These rules are to be interpreted to provide for the just determination of
every criminal proceeding, to secure simplicity in procedure and fairness in administration,
and to eliminate unjustifiable expense and delay") with FED. R. Clv. P. 1 (The rules "shall be
construed and administered to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of
every action.").
20. FED. R. CRIM. P. 8. Rule 8 provides:
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were designed ostensibly as a "substantial restatement of existing
law."22 Like the previous American common law approach, the Rules
allow joinder of offenses and offenders and grant the trial judge broad
discretion to provide remedies. 23

1.

Joinder of Offenses Under the Federal Rules

Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 8(a) allows a joint trial of
offenses "of the same or similar character," "based on the same act or
transaction," or "constituting parts of a common scheme of plan."24 For
(a) Joinder of Offenses. The indictment or information may charge a defendant in separate
counts with 2 or more offenses if the offenses charged-whether felonies or misdemeanors
or both-are of the same or similar character, or are based on the same act or transaction, or
are connected with or constitute parts of a common scheme or plan.
(b) Joinder of Defendants. The indictment or information may charge 2 or more defendants
if they are alleged to have participated in the same act or transaction, or in the same series of
acts or transactions, constituting an offense or offenses. The defendants may be charged in
one or more counts together or separately. All defendants need not be charged in each
count.
Id.
21. FED. R. CRIM. P. 14. Rule 14 provides for relieffromjudicialjoinder:
(a) Relief. If the joinder of offenses or defendants in an indictment, an information, or a
consolidation for trial appears to prejudice a defendant or the government, the court may
order separate trials of counts, sever the defendants' trials, or provide any other relief that
justice requires.
(b) Defendant's Statements. Before ruling on a defendant's motion to sever, the court may
order an attorney for the government to deliver to the court for in camera inspection any
defendant's statement that the government intends to use as evidence.
Id.
22. FED. R. CRIM. P. 8(a) Advisory Committee's notes. The Federal Rules purported to
be a restatement of existing law. With respect to the law of joinder, the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure were innovative in their treatment of multiple defendants charged with
multiple counts. The approach the second sentence of rule 8(b) "formulates a practice now
approved in some circuits," but not the existing law in most circuits before the Federal
Rules. FED. R. CRIM. P. 8(b) Advisory Committee's notes (citing Caringella v. United
States, 78 F.2d 563, 567 (7th Cir. 1935)). For additional instances where the Federal Rules
were not the "substantial restatement of existing law" they purported to be, see supra text
accompanying notes 30, 36.
23. See, e.g., Zafiro v. United States, 506 U.S. 534, 541 (1993) ("Rule 14 leaves the
determination of risk of prejudice and any remedy that may be necessary to the sound
discretion of the district courts.").
24. FED. R. CRIM. P. 8. Joinder and severance are not mandatory under the Federal
Rules. In some instances, the practical application of the rules may make joinder
compulsory. The Fifth Amendment Double Jeopardy Clause may prohibit the prosecutor
from bringing charges later that were not joined in the first trial. The relevant portion of the
Fifth Amendment provides: "nor shall any person be subject for the same offense to be
twice put in jeopardy of life or limb." U.S. CONST. amend. V. To be considered the "same
offense" for double jeopardy purposes, courts apply the Blockburger test that asks: "whether
each [criminal] provision requires proof of an additional fact that the other does not."
Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S.299, 304 (1932). If the second offense does not
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example, a defendant who recklessly operates a vehicle causing several
deaths can be tried in one trial for all of the offenses arising from his
conduct. Likewise, actions that are close in time and space, like
successive shots from a firearm causing multiple deaths, are properly
joined under the rule. Events that are separated by substantial space and
time, but that constitute part of a common scheme can also be properly
joined. For example, a defendant who commits two bank robberies, one
as a "training mission" for the second, can properly be tried under the
rule because the robberies were part of the common scheme. 25
The modem rational for joining offenses into a single trial is that
joinder furthers judicial efficiency. A single trial eliminates the
needless overlap of witnesses and evidence that would occur if the
offenses were separately litigated. A joint trial can diminish delays in
the criminal justice system, reduce the inconveniences to witnesses and
police, and conserve funds. It is for these reasons that the federal court
system favors joinder. 26 A joint trial is not solely for the benefit of the
Government. Defending a single trial is often preferable for the
Defendant, who realizes a mentally exhaustive and monetarily draining
trial and appeal process. A joint trial can also facilitate concurrent
sentencing, which can be to the defendant's advantage.
Nevertheless, joinder of offenses often comes at the cost of real
and perceived prejudice. The Federal Rules balance the value of
accurate and fair outcomes with the necessity for timely and final
decisions by providing for severance. For example, Rule 14 provides
that a judge may sever the trial or provide other relief if prejudice
occurs. 27 Severing the trial is a rare and extreme measure. The more
common relief is a limiting instruction in which the judge directs the

require proof of an addition fact, it cannot be brought in a separate trial. Thus, there is an
incentive for the prosecutor to join all offenses arising from the same facts or risk losing the
convictions. See also, Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 447 (1970) (holding that the issue
preclusion doctrine prohibits the government from relitigating "an issue of ultimate fact that
has been determined by a valid and final judgment"), but see Dowling v. United States, 493
U.S. 342, 349 ( 1990) (limiting Ashe to instances where the government had the same burden
or proof as to a particular issue in both trials). For a summary of the double jeopardy
challenges that RICO has survived, see U.S. Dept. of Justice, Criminal Div., Organized
Crime and Racketeering Section, Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations: A
Manual for Federal Prosecutors 246 (4th ed. 2000).
25. See, e.g., United States v. Taylor, 54 F.3d 967, 973 (1st Cir. 1995) (holding that the
"training mission" and the second robbery were part of the same common scheme).
26. See Zafiro v. United States, 506 U.S. 534, 541 (1993) ("Joint trials 'play a vital role
in the criminal justice system."' (quoting Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200 (1987)).
Justice O'Connor went on to state that the joint trial system "promoted efficiency and served
the interests of justice by avoiding the scandal and inequity of inconsistent verdicts." Id.
27. FED. R. CRIM. P. 14, supra note 21 (quoting Rule 14 in full).
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jury as to which evidence it should consider as part of each offense. 28 A
limiting instruction places faith in the jury's ability to distinguish the
evidence intelligently and apply the law as to each offence. Depending
on the number of offenses joined and the complexity of the evidence,
this may be no easy task for the jury.
The jury is asked to consider evidence that might not be admissible
if the trials were severed. Take for example, a defendant accused of two
robberies. The robberies occurred within two weeks and ten miles of
each other and were committed by a man with a dark suntan who was
wearing sunglasses. 29 The two robberies could properly be joined under
the language of Rule 8 because the robberies were "of the same or
similar character. " 30 The prosecutor must introduce evidence as to each
offense and prove each offense beyond a reasonable doubt. In a
separate trial, evidence of the second robbery could not be admitted
unless it tended to show identity, plan, or otherwise fell into the narrow
category of exceptions prescribed by the Rules of Evidence. 31 When the
offenses are of a "garden variety," and present no particularity from
which the jury could draw the inference of identity, the second robbery

28. See FED. R. CRIM. P.14 construed in US.NITA Commentary, FED. R. CRIM. P. 14.
29. This is slight variation on the facts of Drew v. United States, 331 F.2d 85, 94 (D.C.
Cir. 1964). There, the defendant was charged with robbery and an attempted robbery. Id.
After a detailed examination of Federal Rules of Evidence 404(b), the court held that
because evidence of one robbery would not have been admissible under the Federal Rules of
Evidence if the offenses had been tried separately, and because the prosecution occasionally
failed to distinguish between the two robberies, the defendant's motion to sever was
improperly denied. Id. The Drew court endorsed a test that the evidence must be
sufficiently "simple and distinct" to mitigate the dangers otherwise created by such a
joinder. Id. at 93. Further, joining offenses creates a special burden on the counsel. If
separate offenses are "to be tried together, both court and counsel must recognize that they
are assuming a difficult task the performance of which calls for a vigilant precision in
speech and action far beyond that required in the ordinary trial." Id. at 94.
30. Id. at 93. The "of similar character" language of the rule was a controversial issue
in the Advisory Committee. It originally read "of similar class" and was designed to restate
the federal statute that allowed judges to join felonies. The most vigorous dissenter to this
rule was Robert F. Maguire. Robert F. Maguire, Proposed New Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure, 23 OR. L. REv. 56, 58 (1943).
31. FED. R. Evm. 404(b) provides that:
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts is not admissible to prove the character of
a person in order to show action in conformity therewith. It may, however, be
admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, knowledge, identity, or
absence of mistake or accident, provided that upon request by the accused, the
prosecution in a criminal case shall provide reasonable notice in advance of trial, or
during trial if the court excuses pretrial notice on good cause shown, of the general
nature of any such evidence it intends to introduce at trial.
FED. R. Evm. 404(b ).
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would be inadmissible character evidence. 32 The Rules of Evidence
presuppose that a jury, when faced with multiple offenses against a
single defendant, will infer that the defendant has a propensity for
criminal action and convict on bad character alone. Commentators have
argued, with varying degrees of success, that Rule 8(a) should be
construed in tandem with the Federal Rules of Evidence and that joinder
is proper only when the evidence would be admissible if the charges
were tried separately. 33

2.

The Joinder of Offenders under the Federal Rules

Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 8(b) allows for joinder of
defendants "if they are alleged to have participated in the same act or
transaction, or in the same series of acts or transactions, constituting an
offense or offenses." 34 For example, a defendant charged with a
narcotics violation and a defendant charged with arson and mail fraud
could not be joined unless the government could show that acts are
connected as part of the "same series of acts." 35 In one respect, Rule
8(b) is a narrow rule that, unlike Rule 8(a), does not allow defendants to
be joined if their offenses are of the same or similar character or arose
out of a common scheme. On the other hand, the last two sentences of
8(b) represent a more expansive role of joinder than was permitted at
common law in most jurisdictions. 36 Rule 8(b) goes on to state that:
"[t]he defendants may be charged in one or more counts together or
separately. All defendants need not be charged in each count." 37 These

32. Drew, 331 F.2d at 90. See, e.g., United States v. Solomon, 490 F. Supp. 373, 375
(S.D. Ga. 1980) (evidence of other crimes is admissible to show plan, identity and
preparation); Commonwealth v. Morris, 425 A.2d 715, 720-21 (Pa. 1981) (deciding under a
similar state law that while the evidence could be used to draw the inference of criminal
disposition, it was inadmissible to show a modus operandi); State v. Romero, 634 P.2d 954,
956-57 (Ariz. 1981) (finding that under a similar state rule, evidence of other crimes is
admissible to show identity).
33. See Edward J. Imwinkelried, Using a Contextual Construction to Resolve the
Dispute over the Meaning of the Term "Plan" in Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b), 43 U.
KAN. L. REV. 1005, 1020 (1995) (arguing that the word "plan" in Rule 8, which excludes
"unlinked" plans comprised of diverse, unrelated offenses, was used to mean the same thing
in rule 404(b)).
34. FED. R. CRIM. P. 8(b). For the full text of the rule, see supra note 20.
35. The example in the text is based in part on the indictment in Turkette, 452 U.S. 576
( 1981 ). See infra notes and text 67-81. If the government could prove a conspiracy to
commit narcotics offenses and arson, joinder would be proper. See e.g., United States v.
Castellano, 610 F.Supp. 1359, 1396 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) ("[C]onspiracy presumptively satisfies
Rule 8(a).").
36. FED. R. CRIM. P. 8(b), Advisory Committee's notes.
37. FED. R. CRIM. P. 8(b); see supra note 20 (quoting Rule 8 in full).
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two sentences effectively overturn the restrictive rule in cases like
McElroy and recognized a growing judicial trend toward joinder in
cases where all defendants were not charged with identical crimes.
The rule of joinder is not of constitutional magnitude. 38 It can,
however, raise constitutional questions, particularly when a confession
is involved. In a joint trial, when one defendant confesses, the
confession may contain inculpating references to other co-defendants.
If the confessing defendant chooses not to testify at trial, the codefendants are left unable to cross-examine the evidence against them.
The use of this kind of confession in a joint trial violates the Sixth
Amendment Confrontation Clause. 39 Even with a limiting instruction
(i.e., informing the jury that the confession is only admissible against
the confessing defendant), the use of the confession is barred. 40 This
rule, otherwise termed the Bruton problem, does not bar joinder of
accomplices, but it imposes a significant cost for joinder. The
prosecutor could eliminate all references to all other co-defendants,41 try
the defendants separately, or not use the confession at all. In cases
where many defendants are properly joined, this can be particularly
problematic. In large cases, theoretically, the probability of confessions
should increase because of the reduced protection of one's own
silence. 42
38. Lane v. United States, 474 U.S. 438, 445 (1986) (holding that a proper limiting
instruction can resolve the prejudice of a misjoined count against a defendant).
39. Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968). The Sixth Amendment reads, in full:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public
trial, by an impartial jury of the state and district wherein the crime shall have been
committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the
witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his
favor, and to have the assistance of counsel for his defense.
U.S. CONST. amend VI.
40. Bruton, 391 U.S. at 136.
41. Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200, 208 (1983) (limiting the Bruton rule to
instances where the co-defendant is directly referred to in the confession; confessions which
link a co-defendant to the crime if viewed in light of all the other evidence is admissible).
But see Gray v. Maryland, 523 U.S. 185,186-87 (1998) (holding that the redacting the codefendant's name from the confession could not eliminate direct incrimination because the
jury will often realize that the redaction refers specifically to the co-defendant).
42. See J .R. LUCAS, RESPONSIBILITY 69-72 ( 1993 ). The "Prisoners Dilemma" suggests
a scenario where two prisoners are accused of a serious crime. The prosecution does not
have enough evidence to convict either on the serious crime; however, they have enough to
convict each on a minor crime. The prosecution attempts plea-bargaining with each,
offering a pardon for both the major and minor crime in exchange for testimony securing the
conviction of the other. Each prisoner has a strong incentive to confess, but in acting
selfishly, both defendants will end up worse than if neither confessed. If both confess, they
will receive a long sentence for pleading guilty to a major crime. By keeping silent, they
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Even when joinder is proper, a judge may order a severance under
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 14. Rule 14 states that defendants
and offenses may be severed if a joint trial would prejudice either a
defendant or the government. 43 As at the American common law, the
Federal Rules place the decision to sever a trial squarely within the trial
judge's discretion. A defendant seeking severance under Rule 14 bears
the heavy burden of establishing that prejudice would result from his
joinder with other defendants. As the Supreme Court announced in
Zafiro v. United States, even if potential prejudice can be shown, "Rule
14 does not require severance ... ; rather, it leaves the tailoring of the
relief to be granted, if any, to the district court's sound discretion."44
Often, the given relief comes in the form of a limiting instruction.
Severance should be granted "only if there is a serious risk that a joint
trial would compromise a specific trial right of one of the defendants, or
prevent the jury from making a reliable judgment about guilt or
innocence. " 45
Courts have refused to adopt bright line rules in this area. For
example, in trials where defendants are properly joined only because of
an overarching conspiracy count and the conspiracy count fails for lack
of proof, courts are loath to sever the trials or grant new trials upon
review. 46 This is because courts have opted for the flexible standard of
"substantial prejudice" rather than a rigid rule. 47 After Zafiro, judges
read Rule 14 to tolerate some prejudice in its application. 48 Courts have

may only be convicted of the lesser offense. Id. The incentive to confess becomes greater
as more defendants are joined. Each added defendant increases the other defendants'
apprehension that someone will confess and thus implicate all of them. Acting to maximize
pay-off, defendants in large trials may confess more readily. The Bruton problem does not
arise in this scenario unless the confessor refuses to testify at trial. Alternatively, a codefendant's testimony may exculpate a defendant. Because the co-defendant may not wish
to waive his Fifth Amendment right and testify at trial, the exculpatory testimony will not be
heard. In this respect joinder acts to silence the witnesses that may be the most helpful to
the defendants case. Id. For a classical explanation of this problem, see Peter Westen, The
Compulsory Process Clause, 73 MICH. LR.Ev. 73, 143 (1974); Russell D. Covey, Beating
the Prisoner at the Prisoner's Dilemma: The Evidentiary Value of a Witness's Refusal to
Testify, 47 AM. U.L. REV. 105 (1997).
43. FED. R. CRIM. P. 14; see supra note 21 (quoting Rule 14 in full).
44. Zafiro v. United States, 506 U.S. 534, 538-40 (1993).
45. Id.
46. See, e.g., Shaffer v. United States, 362 U.S. 511, 516 (1960).
47. See, e.g., United States v. Lane, 474 U.S. 438, 445 (1986).
48. Whether or not this application is beneficial is subject to some debate. Tolerating
some prejudice places considerable faith in the jury's ability to differentiate between
defendants and the proof offered of each offense. The ruling in Shaffer also seems to allow
an unscrupulous prosecutor to allege a conspiracy without any proof and reap all of the
benefits of joinder. Justice Douglas argued against this result that "allow[s] conspiracy to
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held that a showing that a defendant would have a better chance of
acquittal if tried alone is not sufficient to order a severance. 49 Mutually
antagonist defenses alone are not enough to mandate severance. 50
Additionally, the trial judge's decision to join defendants is subject to
review only for abuse of discretion, making joinder a difficult, if not
impossible, decision to win on appeal. 51
II.

JOINDER AND RICO: THE ENTERPRISE TRIAL

Joinder under the Federal Rules is more liberal than it was under
the American common law. Both methods, however, aim for a
relatively simple trial of defendants related in the same transaction.
RICO functions within the framework of the Federal Rules as a joinder
mechanism, allowing joinder of defendants and offenses beyond what
would be permitted under the Federal Rules in the context of predicate
offenses standing alone.
The RICO "enterprise" supplies the
connection between superficially unrelated defendants committing
diverse crimes and allows the group to be prosecuted in a single trial.
A.

The RICO Statute

Congress enacted RICO in 1970 as part of the Organized Crime
Control Act. 52 RICO has proven to be an adaptive statutory scheme. It
encompasses both criminal activity that infiltrates legitimate businesses
and criminal activity that conducts itself in a business-like manner.
The statute defines a complex crime, in some ways akin to
conspiracy in that group crime is targeted and the commission of a
"predicate" crime is involved. But RICO accomplishes more than
traditional conspiracy law. It strikes at the organization itself, through

be put to new and dangerous uses when we sanction the practice observed here." Shaffer,
362 U.S. at 534. Yet a bright line rule that provides mandatory severance when the claims
that facilitate joinder fail may have an inapposite effect. Courts balancing efficiency versus
the risk of prejudice have firmly put their thumb on efficiency. Thus, such a bright line rule
may deter the judge from dismissing a conspiracy charge at the cost of severing the
defendants' trials and rehearing the evidence in each case. Thus, perhaps the more sensible
determination is the one the court in Shaffer made.
49. Zajiro, 506 U.S. at 540.
50. Id. at 542.
51. UNITA commentary, supra note 28; see id. at 541-42.
52. As such, RICO was one element of a comprehensive effort to "seek the eradication
of organized crime in the United States by strengthening the legal tools in the evidencegathering-process, by establishing new penal prohibitions, and by providing enhanced
sanctions and new remedies." Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452,
84 Stat. 922, 923 (1970); Michael Goldsmith, RICO and Enterprise Criminality: A
Response to Gerard E. Lynch, 88
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the individuals who affect or are affected by it. 53 Before RICO's
enactment, members of a criminal syndicate could only be prosecuted
individually or as part of a conspiracy. Using RICO, the government
can prosecute individuals employed by or associated with a criminal
enterprise, forming one criminal "enterprise trial" and prosecuting a
wide scope of criminality because RICO's predicate offenses are
themselves diverse. 54
In brief, 18 U.S.C. §1962(c), RICO's core prohibition, makes it a
crime for a person to conduct the affairs of an enterprise through a
pattern of racketeering activity or collection of an unlawful debt. 55 The

53. Michael Goldsmith, RICO and Enterprise Criminality: A Response to Gerard E.
Lynch, 88 COLUM. L. REv. 774, 775 (1988). Goldsmith explains:
Congress recognized that previous efforts against organized crime had failed
because the focus had been on individual prosecutions rather than on organizational
foundations. Since the structure and strength of organized crime transcend its
membership, criminal enterprises could thrive despite successful individual
prosecutions. Reform, therefore, was aimed at the enterprise itself-both directly
and through the means by which organizational control was often acquired.
Id.

54. G. Robert Blakey, The RICO Civil Fraud Action in Context: Reflections on Bennett
v. Berg, 58 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 237, 250 n. 151 , 299 n.165 (1982).
55. RICO,§ 1962, provides in full:
(a) It shall be unlawful for any person who has received any income derived,
directly or indirectly, from a pattern of racketeering activity or through collection of
an unlawful debt in which such person has participated as a principal within the
meaning of§ 2, title 18, United States Code, to use or invest, directly or indirectly,
any part of such income, or the proceeds of such income, in acquisition of any
interest in, or the establishment or operation of, any enterprise which is engaged in,
or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce. A purchase of
securities on the open market for purposes of investment, and without the intention
of controlling or participating in the control of the issuer, or of assisting another to
do so, shall not be unlawful under this subsection if the securities of the issuer held
by the purchaser, the members of his immediate family, and his or their accomplices
in any pattern or racketeering activity or the collection of an unlawful debt after such
purchase do not amount in the aggregate to one percent of the outstanding securities
of any one class, and do not confer, either in law or in fact, the power to elect one or
more directors of the issuer.
(b) It shall be unlawful for any person through a pattern of racketeering activity or
through collection of an unlawful debt to acquire or maintain, directly or indirectly,
any interest in or control of any enterprise which is engaged in, or the activities of
which affect, interstate or foreign commerce.
(c) It shall be unlawful for any person employed by or associated with any
enterprise engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign
commerce, to conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of such
enterprise's affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity or collection of
unlawful debt.
(d) It shall be unlawful for any person to conspire to violate any of the provisions of
subsection (a), (b), or (c) of this section.
18 U.S.C. § 1962 (2004).
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terms "enterprise," "pattern," and "racketeering activity" are not
traditional or common law concepts, but they are drafted in terms of
common law elements as well as statutory constructs. 56 An enterprise,
as defined by section 1961 (4 ), "includes any individual, partnership,
corporation, association, or other legal entity, and any union or group of
individuals associated in fact although not a legal entity. " 57 Likewise,
section 1961 ( 1) defines "racketeering activity" roughly as ( 1) a crime of
violence, (2) provision of illegal goods and services, (3) corruption in
government or labor unions, or (4) commercial fraud. 58 Acts of
"racketeering activity" become a "pattern" when they are "continu[ous]
and relat[ed]," rather than "isolated" or "sporadic."59
RICO, like any offense, can be broken down into person, conduct,
surrounding circumstances, result, and corresponding states of mind. 60
The persons subject to RICO are limited to those "employed by or
associated with" the enterprise. In order to violate RICO the person
must conduct (or participate) through "racketeering activity" and that
conduct must form a "pattern."61
To violate section 1962(c), the surrounding circumstances must

Read together, each section (a)-(d) builds on the next, establishing multiple ways to violate
the RICO statute. Each section provides remedies that are cumulative and not mutually
exclusive. Section (c), the "core" provision, is the most sophisticated and complex violation
of RICO. Subsections (a) and (b) supplement (but do not supplant) the prohibitions of
subsection (c). They provide additional ways of violating RICO's core provision, by
"investment and use" or "acquisition and maintenance" of the enterprise. On the other hand,
subsection 1962(d) is an "inchoate" version of each of the other prohibitions. Its violation
contemplates, but does not require, a substantive violation of the Section. Thus, taken
together, as they must be, the subsections of§ 1962 - the prohibition provisions of RICO
- provide a rich variety of ways to violate RICO, and it subsections fully cover the wide
range of roles (e.g., "perpetrator," "victim," "prize," and "instrument") involved in RICO
violations - by, through, and against an "enterprise." See generally, Thomas O'Neill,
Note, Functions of the RICO Enterprise Concept, 64 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 646 (1989)
[hereinafter RICO Enterprise Concept].
56. Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Assocs., Inc., 483 U.S. 143, 149-50
(1987) ("RICO is designed to remedy injury caused by a pattern of racketeering, and
concepts such as RICO 'enterprise' and 'pattern of racketeering activity' were simply
unknown to common law.") (internal citations omitted).
57. 18 u.s.c. § 1961(4).
58. Blakey, supra note 54, at 300-06.
59. United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 583 (1981); see infra notes 73-87 and
accompanying text.
60. G. Robert Blakey & Kevin P. Roddy, Reflection on Reves v. Ernst & Young: Its
Meaning and Impact on Substantive, Accessory, Aiding Abetting and Conspiracy Liability
Under RICO, 33 AM. CRIM. L REV. 1345, 1666-75 (1996); G. Robert Blakey & Brian
Murray, Threats, Free Speech, and the Jurisprudence of the Federal Criminal Law, 2002
BYU L. REV 829, 1044-50 (2002).
61. The pattern requirement is discussed infra Part II( C).
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show a connection between RICO's key elements, "enterprise,"
"pattern," and "racketeering activity." Specifically, the government
must prove: 1) the existence of the enterprise, 2) the defendant's
employment by or association with the enterprise, 3) the pattern of
racketeering activity, 4) the conduct of the enterprise's affairs "through"
the pattern, and 5) the enterprise's effect on interstate or foreign
In addition to these existing circumstances, the
commerce. 62
substantive offense also incorporates the existing circumstances that are
required to commit the predicate racketeering acts. RICO does not
require a result beyond that required of the predicate acts. That is to
say, the statute does not require that any particular event be caused by
the surrounding circumstances. While the substantive offense might
require a "result," RICO does not under section 1962(c). 63
Nothing on the face of RICO indicates a mens rea requirement
beyond that of the predicate offense. When a statute does not prescribe
a mental element, one may be read into the statute consistent with
legislative intent. 64 Traditionally, if a criminal statute is not merely
regulatory, a mens rea requirement is required. 65 Absent a contrary
intent, courts read the conduct requirement to require a "knowing" state
of mind. 66 In addition, the defendant must "know" of the surrounding
circumstances. This is with the exception of RICO's jurisdictional
requirement that the enterprises have an affect on interstate commerce.
The government need not prove state of mind as to the effect of the
enterprise's activities on commerce. 67
B.

RICO as a Joinder Mechanism

The "heart beat" of the RICO statute is the "enterprise."68 The
enterprise concept allows joinder of defendants and offenders

62. Nancy L. Ickler, Note, Conspiracy to Violate RICO: Expanding Traditional
Conspiracy Law, 58 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 587, 607-08 (1983).
63. But cf 18 U.S.C. § 1962 (b) (requiring acquisition or maintenance as an element of
the offense).
64. United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394, 403-09 (1980). See also United States v.
Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 438 (1978) ("Certainly far more than the simple omission of the
appropriate phrase from the statutory definition is necessary to justify dispensing with the
intent requirement.").
65. Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 258-59 (1952) (scienter required for
common law offenses, but not regulatory offenses).
66. Blakey & Murray, supra note 60.
67. See, e.g., United States v. Feola, 420 U.S. 671, 679 (1975) (holding that knowledge
of the facts giving rise to federal jurisdiction is not necessary for conviction of a substantive
offense embodying a mens rea requirement).
68. See RICO Enterprise Concept, supra note 55, at 646.
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"employed by or associated with" an enterprise or "who conspire to
violate section 1962(c)."69 The enterprise concept is an overarching
element that, like conspiracy, can satisfy the requirements of Federal
Rule 8(b). The "enterprise" connects superficially unrelated defendants
who may not otherwise have been joined. The scope of the trial is thus
highly dependant on how the prosecutor defines the "enterprise."
A RICO enterprise is defined as "include[ing] any individual,
partnership, corporation, association, or other legal entity, and any
union or group of individuals associated in fact although not a legal
entity." 7 Congress chose to define enterprise broadly, using the word
"include[ ing]" to indicate that individuals, partnerships, and
corporations are words of illustration; 71 enterprises existing beyond the
foresight of the drafters may be within the scope of the definition.
Courts applying this language have found private businesses, labor
organizations, non-profit organizations, marriages, government offices
and other "associations in fact" to be an "enterprise" within the statutory
definition of the word. 72 Despite the broad definition of "enterprise"
and a congressional direction that RICO "shall be liberally construed to
effectuate its remedial purposes," 73 over ten years after the passage of
RICO, there remained questions concerning the scope of the term
"enterprise." 74 In order to see the practical effect of the RICO

°

69.
70. 18 U.S.C. §1961(4) (2004). For an excellent history of the court's interpretation of
"association in fact," see Paul Edgar Howard, Note, Quo Vadis, Association in Fact? The
Growing Disparity Between How Federal Courts Interpret RICO 's Enterprise Provision in
Criminal and Civil Cases (With Little Statutory Background to Explain Why), 80 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 781, 801 (2005).
71. United States v. Masters, 924 F.2d 1362, 1366 (7th Cir. 1991).
72. RICO Enterprise Concept, supra note 55, at 654-56.
73 . Pub. Law. No. 91-452, § 9.4(a), 84 Stat. 947 (1970). RICO, like the antitrust
statutes on which it was modeled, uses "a generality and adaptability [of language]
comparable to that found to be desirable in constitutional provisions." Appalachian Coals,
Inc. v. United States, 288 U.S. 344, 359-60 (1993). RICO was drafted "broadly enough to
encompass a wide range of criminal activity, taking many forms, and likely to attract a
broad array of perpetrators operating in many different ways." H.J., Inc. v. Northwestern
Bell Tel. Co., 492 U.S 229, 248-49 (1989). The court in H.J, Inc. stated that "[t]he
occasion for Congress' action was the perceived need to combat organized crime. But
Congress, for cogent reasons, chose to enact a more general statute." Id. Thus, like the
antitrust statutes, "RICO is to be read broadly." Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S.
479, 497-98 (1984).
74. See United States v. Sutton, 605 F.2d 260 (6th Cir. 1979) (holding that illegitimate
enterprises were beyond the ambit of the RICO statute based on the legislative intent), rev 'd
en bane, 634 F.2d 1001 (6th Cir. 1980). See also United States v. Cauble, 706 F.2d 1322,
1330 (5th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1005 (1984) ("enterprise criminality" consists
of "all types of organized criminal behavior [ranging] from simple political corruption to
sophisticated white collar crime schemes to mafia-type endeavors.") (citations omitted).
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enterprise as a joinder mechanism, it is necessary to consider cases
where the court held that "enterprises" did not extend to "illegitimate
enterprises."

1.

Turkette: The Magna Carta ofRICO Prosecutions

The Turkette case involved a nine-count indictment that charged
thirteen men with conspiracy to conduct and participate in the affairs of
an enterprise engaged in interstate commerce through a pattern of
racketeering activity. 75 The only common thread in the nine-count
indictment was defendant Turkette' s alleged leadership in the criminal
organization. 76 The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit held that
because the alleged enterprise was wholly criminal in nature, it was not
an "enterprise" within the meaning of the RICO statute. 77 When the

Defendants in RICO litigation often question whether RICO applies beyond "organized
crime" in the Mafia sense of the word, as if "white-collar crime" were not sometimes
"organized." To be sure, "a" "purpose of RICO" was to combat "organized crime," but that
specific purpose was not its "only" purpose. "[A]lthough the legislative history of RICO
vividly demonstrates that it was primarily enacted to combat organized crime, nothing in
that history, or in the language of the statute itself, expressly limits RICO' s use to members
of organized crime." Owl Constr. Co., Inc. v. Ronald Adams Contractor, Inc., 727 F.2d
540, 542 (5th Cir. 1984) (quoting United States v. Uni Oil Inc., 646 F.2d 946, 953 (5th Cir.
1981 )). "[C]ommentators have persuasively and exhaustively explained why the statute
[does] not require [such a showing]." Id. (citations omitted). Accordingly, RICO fits well
into the typical pattern of Federal legislation aimed at a particular problem, but drafted in
all-purpose language.
The Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871 (18 U.S.C. §§ 241-42 (criminal sanctions) and 42 U.S.C. §
1981, et seq. (civil sanctions)) is a classic example of this type of legislation. Congress
specifically aimed the 1871 Act at the depredations of the Klan in the South after the Civil
War, but under the Act, its criminal and civil sanctions apply to "any person" who deprives
another of civil rights guaranteed under the Constitution or other Federal law. It equally
applies today, for example, to the unlawful conduct of police officers, as in the infamous
Rodney King incident in Los Angeles. See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 183 (1961)
("[The KKK Act is] cast in general language and is applicable to Illinois as it is the States
whose names were mentioned over and again in the debates."), overruled on other grounds,
Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978); Koon v. United States, 518
U.S. 81, 85-88 (1996) (reviewing the facts of the prosecution of the Los Angeles police
officer under 18 U.S.C. § 242 for the beating of Rodney King). King subsequently obtained
a $3.8 million settlement on his civil rights claim under 42 U .S.C. § 1983. See Charles
LeDuff, 12 Years After the Riots, Rodney King Gets Along, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 19, 2004, at
18.
75. United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 578-79 (1981 ).
76. Id. at 579.
77. Compare United States v. Turkette, 632 F.2d 896 (1st Cir. 1980), rev'd, 452 U.S.
576 (1980) (holding that the defendants were all entitled to new trials because joinder was
entirely prejudicial when the RICO counts failed) with United States v. Sutton, 605 F.2d 260
(holding that, when the RICO count failed because the enterprise was wholly criminal in
nature, all defendants were entitled to a new trial because of prejudicial misjoinder).
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RICO claim failed, the joinder of each of the defendants became
improper, and thus, each defendant was granted a new trial.
The Supreme Court in Turkette rejected this interpretation of RICO
as inconsistent with the plain language of the statute. 78 The statute, on
its face, contains no limitation on it application to illegitimate
enterprises. Had Congress intended to include such a limitation, "it
could have easily have narrowed the sweep of the definition by inserting
a single word: 'legitimate."' 79
The definition of enterprise in section 1961 (4) includes two
categories: partnerships, corporations and other "legal entities; and "any
union or group of individuals associated in fact." 80 The Court rejected
the use of the ejusdem generis doctrine to read the statute as if
"associations in fact" was merely a more general description of the first
category of legitimate enterprises. 81 Instead, "associations in fact" is a
"separate type of enterprise to be covered by the statute." 82
This reading of RICO does not create the internal inconsistencies
of which the Circuit Court opined. 83 Including illegitimate associations
in the definition of an "enterprise" does not merge the "pattern of
racketeering" with the concept of "enterprise." The existence of the
"enterprise" is a separate requirement which can be satisfied by
"evidence of an ongoing organization, formal or informal, and by
evidence that the various associates function as a continuing unit. " 84
The "pattern of racketeering" is a series of offenses prescribed by
statute in section 1961(1). 85 While the proof of the "enterprise" and the

78. Turkette, 452 U.S. at 580-81 ("In determining the scope of a statute, we first look to
its language.").
79. Id.
80. 18 U.S.C. §1961 (4) (2004).
81. Turkette, 452 U.S. at 581.
82. Id. at 582.
83. Id. at 582-583 . The Turkette went on to state that:
If "a pattern of racketeering" can itself be an "enterprise" for the purposes of section
1962(c), then the two phrases "employed by or associated with any enterprise" and
"the conduct of such enterprise's affairs through [a pattern ofracketeering activity]"
add nothing to the meaning of the section. The words of the statute are coherent and
logical only if they are read as applying to legitimate enterprises.
Id. at 582.
84. Id. at 579, 583. The Court found sufficient government allegations that the
enterprise consisted of a "group of individuals associated in fact for the purpose of illegally
trafficking in narcotics and other dangerous drugs, committing arsons, utilizing the United
States mails to defraud insurance companies, bribing and attempting to bribe local police
officers, and corruptly influencing and attempting to corruptly influence the outcome of
state court proceedings." Id. at 579.
85. Id. at 583. The "pattern of racketeering activity" is not as easily determined as the
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"pattern of racketeering activity" ma~ overlap, that does not mean that
the requirements are one in the same. 6
Lastly, the Court rejected an argument that the interpretation of
RICO to include illegitimate enterprises would substantially enlarge the
federal jurisdiction into criminal law enforcement, an area of traditional
state control. 87 Even if RICO does change the balance of criminal
enforcement, "Congress was well aware that it was entering a new
domain of federal involvement through the enactment of this
measure." 88 The Court found sufficient evidence in the legislative
record to suggest that Congress purposefully moved to change this
balance, because existing state and federal laws were inadequate to
address the growing problem of organized crime. 89

a.

Proving the Enterprise

The Court in Turkette set down the rule that the existence of
racketeering activity and enterprise are distinct elements of RICO. The
"enterprise" can be proved by "evidence of an ongoing organization,"
and by "evidence that the various associates function as a continuing
unit. " 90 In instances where the alleged enterprise is a corporation or a
partnership, the enterprise element is satisfied by proof of the
organization's legal existence. 91 Where the enterprise is an association
in fact, often the proof will be more difficult. A prosecutor may want to
introduce expert evidence of the family structure of organized crime,
their terminology, and modus operandi to help prove the existence of an
enterprise. 92
Under the Federal Rules of Evidence, an expert is allowed to offer
testimony that will "assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or
to determine a fact in issue."93 For example, a RICO prosecution may

court in Turkette lets on. See notes and text supra Part Il(c ).
86. "While proof used to establish these separate elements may in particular cases
coalesce, proof of one does not necessarily establish the other." Turkette, 452 U.S. at 583.
87. Id. at 586.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 583.
91. Turkette, 452 U.S. at 581-82.
92. Teresa Bryan et al., Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations, 40 AM.
CRIM. L. REV. 987, 997 n.73 (2003); U.S. Department of Justice, supra note 24, at 277.
93 . Federal Rule of Evidence 702 reads in full:
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to
understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an
expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in
the form of an opinion or otherwise, if (1) the testimony is based upon sufficient
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want to introduce explanations of organized crime structure and the
jargon of the leadership hierarchy (i.e.: "capo," "captain," or "crew").
In United States v. Daly, the expert testimony of an FBI agent was
admitted, outlining the structure of the Gambino crime family, with
whom the defendants were allegedly associated. The agent described
the method by which the family had gained control over certain labor
unions in the New York City area. 94 As part of his testimony, the agent
identified labor unions, officials, and members of the crime family who
appeared on surveillance tapes admitted against all of the defendants.
The agent's testimony was "relevant to provide the jury with an
understanding of the nature and structure of organized crime families"
because "[t]here is no question that there was much that was outside the
expectable realm of knowledge of the average juror."95 The courts in
applying this rule admit the background expert testimony and allow the
jury to consider such evidence as "proof of th[ e] overall continuing
enterprise. " 96
Admission of background testimony relevant to the general nature
of mob families has been able to withstand a challenge based on Rule
703, the Bases of Opinion by Experts. This rule provides, in part, that
the facts or data relied upon by the expert, "if of a type reasonably relied
upon by experts in the particular field ... , do not need to be admissible
into evidence" in order to allow the expert opinion to be admitted. 97

facts or data, (2) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods, and
(3) the witness has applied the principles and methods reliably to the facts of the
case.
FED. R. Evm. 702.
94. United States v. Daly, 842 F.2d 1380, 1388 (2d Cir. 1988).
95. Id. at 1388. The Daly court was not entirely faithful to the text of Rule 702. The
rule does not require a showing that the expert testimony consists of information beyond the
expertise of the jury; it does, however, require that the information "assist" the jury in
understanding the evidence. FED. R. Evm. 702, supra note 93.
96. Daly, 842 F.2d 1380, 1389.
97. Federal Rule of Evidence 703 reads in full:
The facts or data in the particular case upon which an expert bases an opinion or
inference may be those perceived by or made known to the expert at or before the
hearing. If of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field in
forming opinions or inferences upon the subject, the facts or data need not be
admissible in evidence in order for the opinion or inference to be admitted. Facts or
data that are otherwise inadmissible shall not be disclosed to the jury by the
proponent of the opinion or inference unless the court determines that their probative
value in assisting the jury to evaluate the expert's opinion substantially outweighs
their prejudicial effect.
FED. R. Evm. 703.
The Federal Rule altered the common law restrictions on the facts and data an expert may
rely on in forming his opinion. The expert's reasonable reliance tended to weigh in favor of
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The Advisory Committee notes explain that a physician in his practice
forms a diagnosis based on numerous sources: test results, statements by
the patient and relatives, and the opinion of other doctors. 98 Most of
these sources would be admissible, but only at the cost of considerable
time at trial and cost of production. Yet, the doctor can make a life or
death decision in reliance upon these sources. Thus, the doctor's expert
opinion "expertly performed and subject to cross examination, ought to
suffice for judicial purposes."99
In the context of a RICO trial, the "reasonable reliance"
requirement of Rule 703 can be an ambiguous term. The government
agents testifying to the nature and organization of the mob have relied
on countless, nameless informers to form their understanding. In
addition, they rely on thousands of hours of wiretaps and prior trial
testimony of mob turncoats. These statements are inadmissible hearsay,
yet, under the rule, if of the type reasonably relied upon by experts in
the field, the expert opinion based upon them is admissible. One
wonders if this is the sort of information that the drafters of the Rules of
Evidence envisioned being admitted under Rule 703. The FBI agent
testifying in these trials can hardly be said to be making "life or death"
decisions when formulating a mental glossary of mob vernacular.
Furthermore, the "reasonableness" of the agent's reliance could be
questioned. Informants are creatures of the underworld themselves and
thus of questionable credibility. Allowing informant information into
the trial in this way can invite untrustworthy testimony without giving
the defendant the opportunity to cross-examine the informant. On the
other hand, there may not be a more knowledgeable (or reasonable)
source than an informant whose life and livelihood revolve around such
customs and vernacular. Accordingly, the courts have been not been
receptive to challenges to the expert's opinion based on informant
hearsay statements. 100 The "liberal thrust" of the federal rules grants the

the evidence's "particular trustworthiness," which satisfied the Confrontation Clause. Ohio
v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 65-66 (1980) (holding that the Confrontation Clause does not allow
admission of hearsay testimony if the declarant is unavailable for cross-examination, unless
the statement bears adequate "indicia of reliability," which can be inferred if "the evidence
falls within a firmly rooted hearsay exception" or exhibits "particularized guarantees of
trustworthiness"). Whether this exception survived Crawford is now the subject of some
debate. See generally Ross A. Oliver, Note, Testimonial Hearsay as the Basis for Expert
Opinion: The Intersection of the Confrontation Clause and the Federal Rule of Evidence
703 After Crawford v. Washington, 55 HASTINGS L.J. 1539 (2004).
98. FED. R. Evm. 703. Advisory Committee's note.
99. Id.
100. United States v. Brady, 26 F.3d 282, 287 (2d Cir. 1994); United States v. Salemo,
868 F.2d 524, 534-536 (2d Cir. 1987); United States v. Daly, 842 F.2d 1380, 1387-88 (2d
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judge "authority and discretion to determine whether novel scientific
evidence is trustworthy." 101 Additionally, the expert evidence is subject
to cross-examination and the broad language of Rule 403.
Federal Rule 403 provides that "[a]lthough relevant, evidence may
be excluded if its probative value is outweighed by the danger of unfair
prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by the
considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation
of cumulative evidence." 102 This limitation works together with the
notion of relevance to provide a sliding scale of what evidence will be
admitted. 103
Even information in newspapers relating to mob
connections, where it was not used by the prosecutor in the trial, if it
comes to the attention of the jury-or might have come to the attention
of a jury-it resulted in granting a new trial in litigation prior to RICO.
104
The stereotypes surrounding organized crime are so damaging that
judges feared that if the jury read or might have read such an article,
they would be inclined to convict on bad character alone, rather than
forming an impartial assessment of the defendant's guilt. 105 Thus, mere
publicity surrounding the trial can become grounds for a mistrial if the
trial court does not take a prompt and effective corrective action to cure
the taint of such reports. 106
The substantive element of a RICO charge changes the application
of Rule 403 with respect to the admission of evidence concerning a
defendant's organized crime connections. Where the alleged enterprise
charged is a crime family, evidence that the defendant was "employed
by or associated with" the family is an essential element of the
charge. 107 If the enterprise is a "crew," a branch of a crime family, the
prosecutor can refer to the larger crime family to establish the crew. 108
"In RICO cases, courts have refused to strike allegations of organized

Cir. 1988).
101. United States v. Losascio, 6 F.3d 924, 938 (2d Cir. 1993) (citing Daubert v.
Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993)).
102. FED. R. Evrn. 403.
103. Id. at Advisory Committee's note.
104. United States v. Accardo, 298 F.2d 133, 133 (7th Cir. 1962) (holding that
"separation of jury, exposing it to newspaper publicity prejudicial to defendant, denied him
fair trial, despite judge's admonition at voir dire, in absence of frequent, specific
admonitions with reference to newspaper accounts"); cf United States v. Gigante, 729 F.2d
78, 84 (2d Cir. 1984) (finding newspaper articles about the mob that would be generally
prejudicial were admissible to prove the reasonableness of the fear of a certain loan shark).
105. Accardo, 298 F.2d at 139 (Duffy, J., concurring).
106. Id. at 136 (majority opinion).
107. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) (2004).
108. United States v. Scarpa, 913 F.2d 993, 1011-12 (2d Cir. 1990).
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crime connections [when they] 'serve to identify the "enterprise" and
the means by which its members and associates conduct various
criminal activities. "' 109 Evidence that is already probative becomes
essential, and should not be excluded under the rule. 110 The same is true
regarding expert testimony. Evidence tending to show the enterprise's
existence and ongoing organization is highly probative and, thus, rarely
excluded under Rule 403. 111
2.

Scope of the Conspiracy

We have seen how RICO's enterprise concept has played out in
prosecuting substantive offenses. RICO also aimed at inchoate group
The majority of RICO
crime through its conspiracy provision. 112
conspiracy cases charge a conspiracy to violate section 1962(c),
conducting an enterprise's affairs through a pattern of racketeering
activity or collection of unlawful debt. 113 In interpreting the conspiracy
provision, courts have held that the words "to conspire" in the statute
invoke the requirements of common law conspiracy.1 14 The basic
109. Id. at 1013 (citing United States v. Napolitano, 552 F.Supp. 465, 480 (S.D.N.Y.
1982)).
110. Id. (citing United States v. DePalma, 461 F.Supp. 778, 797 (S.D.N.Y. 1978)).
111. United States v. Badalamenti, 810 F .2d 17 (2d Cir. 1987); Salerno, 868 F .2d 524
(2d Cir. 1989).
112. Ickier, supra note 62, at 588. To violate RICO, "(1) a person [must] engage in (2)
a pattern of racketeering activity (3) connected to the acquisition, establishment, conduct or
control of an enterprise." St. Paul Mercury Ins. v. Williamson, 224 F.3d 425, 439 (5th Cir.
2000) (citing Delta Truck & Tractor, Inc. v. J.I. Case Co., 855 F.2d 241, 242 (5th Cir. 1988)
(emphasis in the original). "Each concept [in this prohibition] is a term of art which carries
its own inherent requirements ...." Elliot v. Foufas, 867 F.2d 877, 880 (5th Cir. 1989).
Restated in plain English, RICO's core provision prohibits a person employed by or
associated with an enterprise from conducting the affairs of the enterprise through a pattern
or racketeering activity. Section 1962(d) builds on this core section by prohibiting
conspiracies to violate the core provision. For the content of subsections (a), (b), and (c),
see 18 U.S.C.A. § 1962.
113. Ickier, supra note 62, at 588.
114. The relevant statutory phrase in section 1962(d) is "to conspire." Salinas v. United
States, 522 U.S. 52, 63 (1997) ("We presume Congress intended to use the term in its
conventional sense, and certain well-established principles follow."). See generally Aetna
Casualty & Security Co. v. P. & B. Autobody, 43 F.3d 1546, 1561-63 (1st Cir. 1994)
(defendants need not know details or roles of others if they know of a larger scheme to be
guilty of a conspiracy, they need only have "knowingly joined" a conspiracy); United States
v. Gonzales, 921 F.2d 1530, 1539-40 (11th Cir. 1991) ("That the many defendants and
predicate crimes were different, or even unrelated, ... [is] irrelevant, so long as it ... [can]
be reasonably inferred that each crime was intended to further the enterprise."); United
States v. Rastelli, 870 F.2d 822, 828 (2d Cir. 1989) (requiring that a defendant "know the
general nature of the enterprise and know that the enterprise extends beyond his individual
role"). United States v. Friedman, 854 F.2d 535, 562 (2d Cir. 1988) ("A RICO conspiracy
is ... by definition broader than an ordinary conspiracy to commit a discrete crime ....");
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conduct required is agreement. At the English common law, a
conspiracy was punishable even though no overt act, that is, no act
beyond the mere making of the agreement, was completed. 115 A mere
tacit understanding is sufficient to find an agreement was formed. 116
Thus, it is possible for two or more parties to form a conspiracy even
though they do not know the others' identity, are not all aware of the
details of the objective, or are not all original members of the scheme. 117
The clandestine nature of conspiratorial agreements often makes it
difficult to present direct evidence that an agreement transpired. Thus,
juries may properly "rely on inferences drawn from the course of
conduct of the alleged conspirators" to establish an agreement. 118
The person's privy to the agreement and the objective of the
agreement control the scope of the conspiracy. In this regard, RICO
represents an expansion of traditional conspiracy law. At American
common law, defendants engaged in diverse criminal activity that was
superficially unrelated could not be joined in one conspiracy. This was
because a single agreement or common objective could not be inferred
from such assorted activity. RICO helps eliminate this problem. "[T]he
object of a RICO conspiracy is to violate a substantive RICO
provision . . . and not merely to commit each of the predicate crimes

United States v. Valera, 845 F.2d 923, 930 (I Ith Cir. 1988) ("Under the RICO Act ... a
series of agreement, which, pre-RICO, would constitute multiple conspiracies, can form,
under RICO, a single 'enterprise' conspiracy"); United States v. Rosenthal, 793 F.2d 1214,
1233-34 (11th Cir. 1986) ("Congress intended to authorize the single prosecution of a
multifaceted, diversified conspiracy .... The RICO statutes permit the joinder into a single
RICO count or counts several diverse predicate acts .... ").
115. See, e.g., King v. Gill, 106 Eng. Rep. 341 (1818), Poulterers' Case, 77 Eng. Rep.
813 ( 1611 ). Despite that at common law, no overt act was required, the law of conspiracy
does not violate the oft quoted precept that "the law does not punish criminal thoughts."
This is because "the criminal agreement itself is the actus reus." United States v. Shabani,
513 U.S. 10, 16 (1994).
116. See e.g., Iannelli v. United States, 420 U.S. 770, 778 (1975) ("The agreement need
not be shown to have been explicit. It can instead be inferred from the facts and
circumstances of the case"); United States v. Hartley, 678 F.2d 961, 969 (11th Cir. 1982).
117. United States v. Burchinal, 657 F.2d 985, 990-93 (8th Cir. 1981).
118. Interstate Circuit v. United States, 306 U.S. 208, 221(1939); accord WAYNER.
LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW 623 (4th ed. 2003). Allowing the prosecution to rely on inference
of the agreement via the conduct of the alleged conspirators is by no means a new idea.
This idea has been traced back to 183 7 in an oft quoted jury instruction that read:
If you find that these persons pursued by their acts the same object, often by the
same means, one performing one part of an act and the other performing another
part of same act, so as to complete it, with a view to the attainment of the object
which they were pursuing, you will be at liberty to draw the conclusion that they
have been engaged in a conspiracy to effect that object.
WAYNER. LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW 623 (4th ed. 2003) (quoting Regina v. Murphy, 172
Eng. Rep. 502 (1837)).
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necessary to demonstrate a pattern of racketeering activity." 119 Thus,
defendants are properly charged with a conspiracy to violate RICO even
if they "did not commit or even agree to commit the predicate acts that
are elements of a substantive count to be found guilty of the
racketeering conspiracy, for 'it suffices that he adopted the goal of
furthering or facilitating the criminal endeavor. "' 120
This broad definition of conspiracy, which requires neither overt
acts 121 nor an agreement to commit two predicate crimes, 122 allows the
statute to reach the higher level participants of organized crime. To
appreciate this difference consider the scope of conspiracy under
Salinas v. United States. 123 In that case, a sheriff and his deputy were
charged with taking bribes in violation of section 666(a)(l)(B), 124 one
substantive RICO count, and conspiracy tb violate the RICO statute.
The deputy, Mario Salinas, was convicted of all but the substantive
RICO count. 125 In appealing his conviction, Salinas challenged that he
was entitled the jury instruction that, in order to be convicted for a
RICO conspiracy, he must have committed or agreed to commit two
predicate offenses. 126 A unanimous Court opined that Salinas was not
entitled to such an instruction, as it was sufficient that Salinas "accepted
numerous bribes and . . . knew about and agreed to facilitate the
scheme." 127 The paradigm of an organized crime family is an insulated
hierarchical system, wherein those in the bottom rungs of the ladder
often are the ones committing the substantive offences under the
knowledge and facilitation of the enterprise's leaders. The Court in
setting aside the two-act rule in Salinas acknowledged that RICO
enlarged the traditional scope of conspiracy and permits joinder of those
who facilitate violations, but might otherwise be considered unrelated.
3.

The Scope of the Pattern

RICO's enterprise concept plays a critical role in joinder of
offenses and offenders. The concept unites what might otherwise be

119. United States v. Elliott, 571F.2d880, 902 (5th Cir. 1978).
120. United States v. Ciccone, 312 F.3d 535, 542 (2d Cir. 2002) (RICO conspiracy
required no overt act).
121. Id.
122. United States v. Zichettello, 208 F.2d 78, 99 (two act rule set aside).
123. Salinas v. United States, 522 U.S. 52, 63-4 (1997)
124. Theft or bribery concerning programs receiving Federal funds, 18 U.S.C. § 666
(2006); Salinas, 522 U.S. 52 (1997).
125. Salinas, 522 U.S . 52 (1997).
126. Id. at 61.
127. Id. at 66.
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diverse offenses committed by the same defendant or defendants and
makes joinder possible. Similarly, RICO's requirement of a "pattern of
racketeering activity" unites what would otherwise be an assorted set of
predicate offenses. The concept of a "pattern of racketeering activity"
thus facilitates joinder beyond the common law conspiracy or the
"common scheme" joinder of what the Federal Rules would allow in the
context of individual offenses standing alone.
A pattern "requires at least two acts of racketeering activity, one of
which occurred after the effective date of this chapter [October 15,
1970] and the last of which occurred within ten years (excluding any
period of imprisonment) after the commission of a prior act of
racketeering .... " 128 The two violations may be violations of state or
federal law, they need not be violations of the same statute, and the acts
need not be previously charged. 129 Simply proving two acts may not,
however, be enough to establish a violation. The Supreme Court in
H.J., Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Telephone Co., 130 held that the
prosecution must prove a relationship between the predicate acts (or an
external organizing principle) and continuity (or its threat) of those acts
in order to prove a "pattern of racketeering activity." This test,
commonly referred to as the "continuity plus relationship requirement,"
has read this provision to mean that "there is something to a RI CO
pattern beyond simply the number of predicate acts involved." 131
In order to establish continuity, the acts must either consist of "a
series of related predicates extending over a substantial period of
time" 132 or present "the threat of continuing activity" 133 The Court
suggested that continuity should be examined on a case by case basis, 134
but that ultimately "development of these concepts must await future
cases." 135
The relationship requirement is met when a pattern of predicate
128. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5) (2005). See generally, G. Robert Blakey & Brian Gettings,
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO): Basic Concepts-Criminal and
Civil Remedies, 53 TEMPLE L. Q. 1009, 1029-30 (1980) (describing the element of "pattern"
in the RICO statute).
129. Sedima v. Imrex Co., Inc., 473 U.S. 479, 482, 488-92 (1985) (holding that there
was no requirement of a prior conviction of a racketeering offense in order to succeed on a
civil RICO charge).
130. H.J., Inc., 492 U.S. 229 (1989).
131. Id. at 238-39.
132. Id. at 242.
133. Id at 239 (citing 116 CONG. REC. 18940 (1970) (Sen. McClellan (quoting S. REP.
No. 91-617))).
134. Id. at 243 .
135. H.J. Inc., 492 U.S. at 243.
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acts "embraces criminal acts that have the same or similar purposes,
results, participants, victims, or methods of commission, or otherwise
are interrelated by distinguishing characteristics and are not isolated
events." 136 This interpretation of "pattern" extends the scope beyond
traditional conspiracy law 137 or "multiple scheme" joinder under the
federal rules. 138 In organized crime prosecutions, the "pattern of
racketeering activity" brings together an enterprise's illegal activities
and allows for one trial. 139 The relationship between the "pattern" and
the "enterprise" is key. Two racketeering acts "that are not directly
related to each other may nevertheless be related indirectly because each
is related to the RICO enterprise." 14 For example, evidence of a
murder and an illegal sportbooking operation, are properly joined,
provided that these "predicate act[ s] [are] sufficiently related to the
enterprise's activities." 141 Further, the predicate acts need only be
related to the affairs of the enterprise, they need not further the
enterprise's buisness. 142 Thus, the relationship between "pattern" and

°

136. Id. at 240 (quoting Dangerous Special Offender Sentencing Act, Title X, 18
U.S.C. § 3575 (repealed 1984)).
137. In traditional conspiracy law, charging one conspiracy and proving several
conspiracies may justify a reversal, even if no evidence was improperly admitted against a
defendant. See, e.g., Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750 (1946). That indictment
charged one large conspiracy, and the prosecution proved eight smaller conspiracies. The
Court found, "The dangers of transference of guilt from one to another across the line
separating conspiracies, subconsciously or otherwise, are so great that no one really can say
prejudice to substantial right has not taken place." Id. at 774. Further, to be guilty of a
conspiracy charge, a defendant need not have been personally engaged in a prohibited
activity. Salinas v. United States, 522 U.S. 52, 63-4 (1997). Aiders and abettors and coconspirators are equally liable for predicate acts committed by co-defendants. Salinas, 522
U.S. at 63.
138. See supra notes 24-25 and accompanying text.
139. United States v. Elliott, 571 F.2d 880, 902 (5th Cir. 1978) ("RICO helps to
eliminate ... [problems common to joint trials] by creating a substantive offense which ties
together these diverse parties and crimes."); United States v. Turkette, 632 F.2d 896, 909-10
(1st Cir. 1980), rev'd, 452 U.S. 576 (1981) ("This case points up another infirmity in the
government's interpretation of RICO: it avoids the strictures of Rule 8(b). By inserting the
RICO conspiracy charge, the government consolidated in one indictment acts and
transactions which otherwise could not have been joined.").
140. United States v. Indelicato, 865 F.2d 1370, 1383 (2d Cir. 1989) (en bane) (finding
that three murders committed at the behest of the Bonanno crime family forms a pattern).
141. United States v. Minicone, 960 F.2d 1099, 1108 (2d Cir. 1992) ("[I]nformal
organization associated for the common purpose of engaging in an ongoing course of
criminal conduct, including extortion, loansharking, illegal gambling, and trafficking in
stolen property" can demonstrate a pattern ofracketteering activity).
142. United States v. Losascio, 6 F.3d 924, 943 (2d Cir. 1993) (deciding that, in the
trial of John Gotti, the jury was properly instructed that it could find the defendants guilty
even if it found that the racketeering acts charged in the indictment were committed
exclusively for the individual's own purpose, not to further the goals of the Gambino
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"enterprise" encompases more than the acts might otherwise be joined
absent a RICO charge. 143

4.

Proving the Conspiracy

The co-conspirator exemption to the hearsay rule helps obviate the
difficulties in proving large-scale conspiracies and conspiratorial
agreements. At American common law and under the Federal Rules of
Evidence, the statements of a party's co-conspirators can be used
against a party as a party admission. 144 This hearsay exception is an
important weapon in combating RICO offenses. The co-conspirator
exemption to the hearsay rule (defined in the Federal Rules of Evidence
as an admission by a party-opponent) states that "a statement is not
hearsay" and is therefore admissible if made "by a coconspirator of a
party during the course, and in furtherance of, the conspiracy." 145 The
rationale for this rule is based on a theory of agency. The "unity of
interests" of the conspirators generally makes it reasonable to treat any
statement against interest made by a co-conspirator as an adopted
statement of the defendant. 146 A conspiracy need not be charged for the
statement to be admissible, but the trial judge must find by a
preponderance of the evidence that the statement was made by a coconspirator of the defendant in furtherance of the conspiracy. 147 A
statement consisting of merely "idle chatter" is thus excluded by the
rule. 148
In a RICO trial, the statements of co-conspirators become vitally
important in proving the scope of the enterprise and each defendant's

family).
143. United States v. Sutton, 605 F.2d 260, 274 (6th Cir. 1979) rev'd, 642 F.2d 1001
(6th Cir. 1980) (en bane). In Sutton, the defendants "were running a virtual department
store of crime." Id. at 274 (dissent). When the RICO charge failed in Sutton, "joinder of the
remaining counts could not have been sustained under Rule 8." Id. at 272; see also
Turkette, 632 F .2d at 909-10.
144. Federal Rule 80l(d)(2)(E) reads that a statement is not hearsay if it is:
[A] statement by a coconspirator of a party during the course and in furtherance of
the conspiracy. The contents of the statement shall be considered but are not alone
sufficient to establish the declarant's authority under subdivision (C), the agency or
employment relationship and scope thereof under subdivision (D), or the existence
of the conspiracy and the participation therein of the declarant and the party against
whom the statement is offered under subdivision (E).
FED. R. Evm. 80l(d)(2)(E).
145. Id.
146. United State v. Gigante, 166 F.3d 75, 83 (2d Cir. 1999).
147. See Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 175 (1987); accord United States v.
Maldonado-Rivera, 922 F.2d 934, 958 (2d Cir. 1990).
148. Salerno, 868 F.2d at 536.
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role in the organization. 149 Furthermore, much more co-conspirator
hearsay is available. 150 This is because "the conspiratorial ingenuity of
La Cosa N ostra expands the normal boundaries of a criminal enterprise,
and Rule 801 (d)(2)(E) must expand accordingly to encompass the full
extent of the conspiracy." 151 There are more conspirators and thus more
available statements in furtherance of the conspiracy, but also much
more for a presecutor to prove. The co-conspirator exception to the
hearsay rule is useful in prosecuting organized crime because the
hierarchical structure involved. This structure, with its various levels of
participation, often includes oath of silence and threats discouraging
members from testifying against each other. In the event that the
government is able to "tum" one of the members, the testimony of the
member about other conspirators statement is admissible under the coconspirator exception; it is often the most probative and important
evidence in securing the conviction. 152
When Congress enacted RICO, it did so as part of a comprehensive
effort to change the means by which the government attacked organized
crime. 153 When Congress changed the substantive law, it necessarily
changed the application of procedural and evidentiary rules. Thus,
RICO's focus on "enterprise" criminality makes a single trial of all
offenders in a crime family possible and appropriate. The statute's
success has been in part because it permits a judge and jury to

149. See, e.g., United States v. Amato, 15 F.3d 230, 234 (2d Cir. 1994) (holding that
statements informing other members "as to the progress or status of the conspiracy" are
admissible under the exception); United States v. Rastelli, 870 F.2d 822, 837 (2d Cir. 1989)
(finding that statements "which provide[s] reassurance, serve[s] to maintain trust and
cohesiveness among them, or inform[s] [them] of the current status of the conspiracy
further[s] the ends of the conspiracy") (internal citations omitted); United States v. Paone,
782 F.2d 386, 391 (2d Cir. 1986) (admitting a narrative of several murders by apprising a
coconspirator of the progress of the conspiracy); United States v. Persico, 832 F.2d 705, 716
(2d Cir. 1987) (trial court's ruling on whether a statement was "in furtherance" of the
conspiracy only overturned if clearly erroneous); U.S. Department of Justice, supra note 24,
at 139-41.
150. Gigante, 166 F.3d at 82.
151. Id.
152. See e.g., Paone, 782 F.2d at 390. In Paone, one witness testified about a
conversation regarding a murder in which the defendants participarted. One defendant was
"reported as commenting on the manner in which [the victim] was killed, stating that it took
only one bullet." Id. Another defendant "was reported as saying he wished that he had been
present to watch [him] bleed." Id. The court held that while this testimony was graphic and
devastating to the defendant's case, it was nevertheless admissible under the exception. Id.
153. For a discussion of the legislative history surrounding RICO, see G. Robert
Blakey, The RICO Civil Fraud Action in Context, 58 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 237, 249-80
(1982); see also, G. Robert Blakey & Kevin P. Roddy , Reflections on Reves v. Ernst &
Young, 33 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1345, 1666-75 (1995).
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understand exactly what the defendants did in a way that the American
common law procedural and evidentiary rules did not.
III. ENGLISH EXPERIENCE: JOINDER AND SEVERANCE

The success of RICO makes the statute an appealing model for
other nation's legislation. In late 2004, when the U.K. considered
modernizing its organized crime legislation, the Home Office looked to
RIC0. 154 After a cursory review of the statute, the Home Office in its
White Paper, "One Step Ahead: A 21st Century Strategy to Defeat
Organized Crime," dismissed RICO as "not need[ed] at this stage." 155
Its evaluation of the statute did not, however, consider the procedural
and evidentiary impact of the statute. This section discusses the current
landscape of the U.K. legal system with respect to its application of
procedural and evidentiary rules. Part A briefly discusses organized
crime in the U.K., as the nation's perception of the problem will
inevitably effect the legislative relief fashioned. Part B explains the
existing procedural rules and how they militate against prosecuting
group crime in the U .K. Part C examines the evidentiary rules and
corresponding rights of defendants.

A.

Perception of the problem

In 2004, the Home Office issued a White Paper titled "One Step
Ahead: A 21st Century Strategy to Defeat Organised Crime." The
White Paper was not to first and, arguably, will not be the last, attempt
to understand organized crime in the U.K. Previous inquires occurred
in 1989 when the Home Affairs Committee considered the impact of
organized crime in connection with drug trafficking. 156 The issue was
revisited again in 1995 by the Home Affairs Committee 157 and again

154. See HOME OFFICE, ONE STEP AHEAD: A 21ST CENTURY STRATEGY TO DEFEAT
ORGANISED
CRIME,
2004,
Cm.
6167'
at
40,
available
at
http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/docs3/wp_organised_crime.pdf [hereinafter White Paper].
155. Id.
156. This committee produced both the report DRUG TRAFFICKING AND RELATED
SERIOUS CRIME, 1988-89, H.C. 370, and PRACTICAL POLICE CO-OPERATION IN THE
EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, 1989-90, H.C. 363-I. Neither takes on trial procedure as a means
of effectively enforcing existing states. Both these committees [sic] were representative of a
growing European awareness of organized crime, particularly the transboundary issues of
crime. See, e.g., HOME AFFAIRS COMMITTEE, ORGANISED CRIME: REPORT, TOGETHER WITH
THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE COMMITTEE, 1994-95, H.C. 18-I, at ix n.1 [hereinafter 1995
REPORT] (citing Dutch Parliament, Italian Parliament, and EU Parliament reports on
organized crime).
157. 1995 REPORT, supra note 156; HOME AFFAIRS COMMITTEE, ORGANIZED CRIME:
MINUTES OF EVIDENCE, 1994-95, H.C. 18-II [hereinafter 1995 EVIDENCE]; HOME AFFAIRS
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most recently in the White Paper. Nevertheless, these attempts were
largely innocent of the procedural and evidentiary issues that surface in
an organized crime trial. While most of these attempts considered and
dismissed the implementation of a RICO-type statute, the analyses did
not consider the advantages of modernizing the trial process.
Specifically, the reports did not consider the benefits of a RICO-type
trial in which the judge and jury can see exactly what the defendants
have done, in way that was not exposed in the context of English
common law offenses and their concomitant procedural and evidentiary
rules.

B.

Organized Crime in the U.K.?

The nation's perception of organized crime will inevitably shape
the form of relief chosen. The clandestine nature of organized crime
adds complexity to any assessment of the scope of the problem and the
U.K. is no different. 158 The Committee Reports and White Paper see
organized crime as primarily an issue of enforcement 159 and frontier
control. 160 This summer, the White Paper proposed the creation of a
new enforcement branch: The Serious Organized Crime Agency. 161 The
agency brings together the National Checking Service (NCS), the
National Criminal Intelligence Service (NCIS), Her Majesty's Customs
& Excise (HMCE), and the Immigration Service's intelligence efforts
and eliminates problems of "duplication" and "bureaucracy." 162
The White Paper recognized, more so than any other attempt, that
COMMITTEE, ORGANIZED CRIME: MEMORANDA, 1994-95, H.C.18-11 [hereinafter 1995
MEMORANDA].
158. Much of the U.S. information on the activities of organized criminals has been
supplied via wiretaps obtained pursuant to Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe
Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-351, 82 Stat. 197, 212-225 (1968) (codified as amended
at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2521) (1988)); S. REP. No. 90-1097, at 66 (1968). The U.K., in the
wake of the July 2005 terrorist attacks, proposed changes to its domestic wiretapping law.
See, e.g., Sarah Lyall, 3 Main British Parties to Back Tougher Antiterrorism Laws, N.Y.
TIMES, July 27, 2005, at A6 (indicating all three parties willingness to admit wiretap
evidence in terrorism trials); Noel McAdam, Phone-tap Plea in Terror Battle: Blair to
Consider Move on Evidence, BELFAST TELEGRAPH, July 22, 2005.
159. 1995 REPORT, supra note 156 (concluding that "there is a considerable need for
coordination in intelligence sharing and operational action between agencies" but that better
enforcement could be obtained through the "development of existing structures rather than
the creation of a new one.").
160. Id. at xxxiv ("We conclude that it remains vital for the government to ensure that
(a) that there is no erosion in the effectiveness of the United Kingdom's frontier controls,
and (b) that the External Frontiers Convention, when it is eventually concluded, will be
effective in protecting both Europe's external frontiers and the U .K.' s national borders.").
161. See White Paper, supra note 154, at 21.
162. Id. at 22.
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"most organized criminals in the U.K. are U.K. nationals." 163 Until the
late 1980s, the term "organized crime" was used "almost exclusively to
describe Sicilian-American crime groups in North America." 164 Indeed,
the 1995 reports on organized crime show almost no awareness of
homegrown organized crime.
The Home Office Report to the
Committee suggested that "there do not appear to be any domestic
groups in this country of the level of organization or sophistication that
would meet the NCIS definition [of organized crime]." 165 Furthermore,
the Committee found no evidence that organized crime was operating
within the higher echelons of government or unions in the U.K. 166
Accordingly, since the U.K. found no evidence in 1995 of any problem
starting at home, the response was largely an appeal for multilateral
policing so as to prevent the spread of crime from nations in South
America or Eastern Europe. 167
1.

The White Paper's Response

The 2004 White Paper takes a different approach. The links
between the U .K. and other nations are still emphasized, but the need
for better legislation was acknowledged. The Home Office "found a
number of areas where the current legal framework appears not to be fit
for purpose in combating organized crime and has developed a series of
proposals for enhanced powers to be targeted on those who cause most

163. Id. at 11.
164. 1995 MEMORANDA, supra note 157, Memo 15, at 193 (Dr. Barry A. K. Rider,
Organized Crime in the United Kingdom: A Personal Perspective).
165. 1995 REPORT, supra note 156, at xv (citing 1995 EVIDENCE, supra note 157, at
147, Q6). The report goes on to state the opinion of one expert that "there is little evidence
that in the United Kingdom, there are indigenous groups which have these characteristics
[ie: of organized crime groups]." Further, the CPS reported that the "gang-land crime in
East London, such as that encountered in the 1960s ... has not generally been encountered
in the last few years." Id. at xv.
166. See 1995 EVIDENCE, supra note 157, at 147, Q361. The U.K. was found to be less
likely than other countries to be vulnerable to corruption. The Home Office memo stated in
part this is because the U .K. does not have "a history of corruption which can help
organized groups get a strong foothold. We benefit from having a well established public
sector with safe guards ... against partiality and corruption." Id.
167. See 1995 REPORT, supra note 156, at xv-xviii. The 1995 report evinces a very "its
an island, so if you didn't bring it, it's not here approach" type approach. As stated above,
the recommendations are aimed at prevention and policing rather than legislative
enactments and trial procedures. This is not to say that this approach is right or wrong, only
that the U.K. perception of organized crime has shaped the Committee's response. To the
extent the 1995 report addressed the criminal procedure, and it did in paragraphs 148-157,
the Committee did not address issues of joinder and evidence. The only procedural reform
raised (and it was rejected) was a proposal to limit disclosure. Id. at liii.
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harm." 168 Thus, the White Paper begins with RICO, the mother of all
organized crime statutes. 169
The White Paper begins its analysis by, quite correctly, pointing
out the advantages of the statute. RICO enables trials to be removed to
federal courts,1 70 and allows for longer sentences for offenders. 171
RICO also allows the prosecutors to link together otherwise diverse
crimes committed in the context of racketeering. The White Paper
points out, as most important among the statute's salient feature, the use
of civil RICO as an enforcement measure. 172 The Paper concludes that:
Against this background, the Government has carefully considered the
case for RICO style legislation to be introduced here. We are not
convinced of the need at this stage. To work, RICO still needs
sufficient evidence to convict on the underlying "predicate" offence
before these can be set in the wider racketeering context. It does not,
therefore, help against those targets who have evaded detection
altogether. RICO appears to be more useful against traditional
"racketeering" organisations than the sort of large scale trafficking
groups which are the main threat in the U .K. 173

Instead of suggesting a RICO-type statute, the Commission opts
for future legislative enactments that enhance current legislation.
Specifically, organized criminals are most likely to be charged with a
specific act to supply commodity, which as the White Paper suggests,
only counters low-level organizers and couriers.1 74 Additionally, the
paper suggests other legislative solutions like revamping conspiracy
provisions or creating a membership crime.1 75 To the degree that these

168. White Paper, supra note 154, at 39.
169. Id. at 40. This is not the first time that the RICO has been suggested by U.K.
crime reform efforts. Dr. Barry Rider of Jesus College in Cambridge submitted a
memorandum to the Home Affairs Committee in 1995 arguing for the adoption of a RICOtype statute. The statute was only mentioned once in the Committee's final report, but
apparently no further consideration was taken at that time.
170. Because RICO is a federal criminal statute it incorporates a jurisdictional element
of the offence, namely that the enterprise effect interstate commerce. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(a)(c) (2004); RICO Enterprise Concept, supra note 55, at 678. This clearly, is not a selling
point in the U .K. legal system, which has neither a state nor federal government; they have
only "government."
171. Under criminal RICO, the person guilty of acquiring, maintaining, or conducting
an enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activity may be heavily fined and imprisoned
for up to 20 years, or for life, if the maximum penalty for a predicate offense includes life.
18 U.S.C. §1963 (2004).
172. White Paper, supra note 154, at 40.
173. Id.
174. Id.at41.
175. Id.
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hypothetical statutes would be effective, they still do not address one of
the primary problems in that U.K. criminal procedure strongly prefers
small trials, which almost inevitably fails to join together the offender
and offense and allow crucial evidence of the involvement of organized
crime leaders. The White Paper failed to address one important aspect
of RICO's success: the joinder of offenses and offenders into one trial
that allows the judge and jury to see exactly what the offenders have
done.

2.

The Consultation Papers Guidance

The White Paper's response was informed by the work of Michael
Levi, a professor of criminology and consultant to the Home Office.
Professor Levi, in his consultation paper to the British government,
summarizes some of RICO's procedural advantages illustrated in this
Article. 176 Levi states that the statute both "enables prosecutors to show
the nature of an enterprise, putting forward a context within which the
offences occurred" and eases "issues of joinder and severance ...
permitting a trial of more co-defendants." 177 Nevertheless, Levi
discourages enacting a RICO-type statute in the U.K. because the
statute lengthens trials, confuses the jury, and requires more proof than
traditional conspiracy crimes. 178 Levi concludes that RICO, while
176. MICHAEL LEVI & ALASTER SMITH, A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF ORGANIZED
CRIME CONSPIRACY LEGISLATION AND PRACTICE AND THEIR RELEVANCE TO ENGLAND AND
WALES
(Home
Office
Online
Report
2002),
www .homeoffice.gov. uk/rds/pdfs2/rdsolr 1702.pdf.
177. Id. at 4.
178. Id. at 4-5. Levi enumerates seven specific objections to the statute:
1. It takes a lot of work to build up a case. Investigators need accurate intelligence

about an organisation before they can start. They need databases and intelligence
analysts and good computer systems that are capable of dealing with 10 years of
data including assets, upfront businesses and covert businesses.
2. There are Performance Indicator implications, as there will be smaller numbers
of cases (though the number of individual defendants could be used as an
alternative).
3. It lengthens trials and the jury sometimes loses track of particular defendants and
their roles, this in tum sometimes leads to severances of cases.
4. It may also be hard for jurors to appreciate what constitutes an 'enterprise' under
the legislation. It is somewhat labyrinthine to show a pattern of crimes and the
existence of an organisation to carry them out, and then that the organisation is
operating through a pattern of criminal activity.
5. There are regional variations. Judges in Manhattan get many cases, whereas
regional ones are rarer. The level of judicial experience, as well as regional court
cultures, sometimes produces what is regarded as "bad law."
6. There is a risk of abuse which, both as an issue of principle and to preserve
existing powers from judicial and political attack, has to be monitored.
7. There are human rights concerns over the potential for the legislation to be used
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successful against organized crime on the U.S. Continent, could not be
successfully transplanted because the cultural difference between the
U.S. and U.K. He states:
One can think of no 20th century U.K. parallels to the levels of corrupt
control over city life and aspects of commercial services that have
been witnessed in the U.S. Although there have been instances of
entrenched local cultures of corruption in England and Wales, there
have been none yet revealed that include large trenches of police as
well as elected officials, and no systematically corrupt union
domination or pension fund abuses or toxic waste dumping has
surfaced in England or Wales. 179

For all of these reasons, he concludes, the cost of implementing a
RICO type statute outweighs the "numerically small but perhaps
over-zealously.
Id.

Levi's first point is fair enough. In a RICO case, the prosecutor must prove additional
elements not present in traditional common law offenses, namely the "enterprise" and
"pattern" of predicate activity. As illustrated in Part 1 of this Article, more evidence is
available to the prosecutor by the operation of the "enterprise" and "pattern" concepts. So
while an element may require proof, much more is admissible to prove that element. In the
U.S., wiretapping is instrumental in proving the "enterprise" and "pattern" elements. In the
U.K., wiretap evidence is inadmissible. To the extent Professor Levi's concern is that RICO
would be useless without wiretap evidence, an amendment to the U.K.'s law of evidence is
in order. Id. at 17. This Article argues for such a change. If, instead, this point is arguing
that a RICO statute would require expenditures for wiretapping evidence, such equipment is
already in use. According to the Home Office's own website, wiretapping is successfully
used by the Home Office. In 2003 alone, wiretapping lead to over 1,680 arrests. Frequently
Asked Questions, http://www.homeoffice.gov. uk/terrorism/faq/atcsa_faq.html# 1 (last
visited July 17, 2005) [hereinafter Frequently Asked Questions]. Yet, in each of these cases
the wiretap evidence was inadmissible in at trial.
Levi's second point, that implementing a RICO statute would require a change in internal
procedures for counting cases, seems to have answered itself.
Joint trials would
presumptively yield fewer cases, but the total number of defendants could increase. Indeed,
the joint trial seems to be at the core of Levis objections. This Article specifically addresses
point 3 and 4. See infra Part IV(B)(2).
Levi's last two objections are not unique to RICO. Like most federal statutes, RICO has
developed regional nuances that vary within the circuits. Nevertheless, when considering
whether to adopt a RICO-type statute, the U.K. is not married to any particular
interpretation. The drafters of such a hypothetical RICO statute could easily insert language
favoring one interpretation over another. Similarly, the overzealous use of a criminal statute
is not unique to RICO. Any criminal statute can be misused or overused, that choice is left
to the prosecutor. If the concern is that a RICO-type statute would be too powerful, the
drafters could require prior authorization to use the statute. Such is the case in the U.S .. See
Department of Justice, supra note 24.
179. LEVI & SMITH, supra note 176, at 16.

Published by SURFACE, 2006

35

Syracuse Journal of International Law and Commerce, Vol. 34, No. 1 [2006], Art. 3

76

Syracuse J. Int'l L. & Com.

[Vol. 34:41

strategically important cases in which RICO legislation might lead to
convictions." 180
The Consultation Paper misunderstands two important features of
RICO. First, RICO has proven to be a powerful tool against legitimate
business and government offices infiltrated by organized crime, yet its
scope is not limited to such instances. As the Supreme Court held in
Turkette, "neither the language nor structure of RICO limits its
application to legitimate 'enterprises. "' 181
Second, the White Paper and the Consultation paper informing its
decision are premised on the notion that the U.K. does not experience
true "organized crime" crime in the same way the US does or did prior
to the passage of RICO. They state that "RICO appears to be more
useful against traditional 'racketeering' organizations than the sort of
large-scale trafficking groups which are the main threat to the U.K." 182
The visible manifestations of organized crime in the U.K. are manifold.
The U.K. experiences drug crimes, 183 human trafficking, 184 international
car theft rings, and counterfeit goods smuggling. 185 While a full-scale
investigation of organized crime is far beyond the scope of this Article,
a preliminary look at the crimes reported in London's newspapers
reveal the presence of precisely the kind of groups RICO's enterprise
concept has been so effective against. For example, large groups of
Eastern European women are routinely trafficked, against their will, into
Britain for prostitution. These kinds of operations require a host of
"suppliers" in Eastern Europe, "importers" to physically move these

180. Id. at 17.
181. United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 587 (1981).
182. White Paper, supra note 154, at 40.
183. Stewart Tendler, Suspected Drugs Baron Arrested, TIMES (London), Mar. 18,
2005, at 35 (leader of a 15 member gang arrested for smuggling three tons of cocaine into
Britain from 1996 to 1998); Daniel McGrory, "Drugs Boss" Is Silent As Investigators Seize
£ 5m, TIMES (London), Mar. 25, 2005, at 16; Stewart Tendler, Family of Drug Barons Kept
Their Stash in Crooked Bank, TIMES (London), May 11, 2005, at 9.
184. Rosemary Bennet, Men Who Pay for Sex with Trafficked Girls to Face Rape
Charge, TIMES (London), Mar. 2, 2005, at 24 ("[I]n 2002, 1,400 women are trafficked into
Britain for sex and [there is reason to believe] that figure has doubled"); Andrew Norfolk,
Millionaire Gangmaster Faces Jail Over His Scots Factory Slave Army, TIMES (London),
Feb. 4, 2005, at 11 (man arrested for transporting Eastern Europeans to U.K. to work for
"slave wages").
185. Illegal importation of other illegal products is also sophisticated in the U.K.. See
e.g., Jon Ungoed-Thomas, Designer Fakes "Are Funding Al-Qaeda," TIMES (London), Mar.
20, 2005, at 14 (cheap counterfeits of designer goods funding terrorist organizations);
Anthony Browne, Customs Not Able to Keep Up With Rise of Fake Goods, TIMES (London),
Feb. 9, 2005, at 29 ("Britain is losing the battle with organized criminals smuggling
counterfeit goods in the country.").
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women, and coordination of over 730 flats in London to house and
control women upon their arrival, not to mention associates to launder
the profits. 186 These groups have the coordination to engage in largescale international criminal enterprises, yet they are not considered
"organized crime" in the U .K. These few examples, pulled from the
front pages, indicate the tip of the iceberg of U.K. crime. The
possibilities of criminal enterprises operating just under the surface of
detection are endless. Still, neither the 1995 reports nor the White
Paper recognizes this phenomena.
3.

U.K. Criminal Procedure

Before examining the law relating to group trials in the U.K., a
brief introduction to the nation's criminal procedure and defendants'
rights are in order. The U.K. is one of very few traditional common law
countries without a written constitution. 187 As a result, there was a
limited public understanding of the form and substance of a U.K.
citizen's rights. 188 Until the European Convention on Human Rights of
1998 came into force in October 2, 2000, few rights were codified. 189
Indeed, even after the adoption of the Convention, some rights that
British citizens enjoy, like the law of double jeopardy, cannot be found
in statute form. 190 Whenever convention rights are at issue, the courts
are not bound by pre-convention precedent 191 and they "must take into
account" judgments, decisions, or declarations of the European Court of
Human Rights (ECHR). 192 Most of the ECHR interactions with the
criminal law involve the concept of a fair trial 193 (Art. 6) and the

186. Bennett, supra note 184.
187. See generally Penny Darbyshire, EDDEY & DARBYSHIRE ON THE ENGLISH LEGAL
SYSTEM § 1-021.
188. Id. ("There is no talk of fundamental constitutional rights, as is common in
Germany or France and is drummed into each child's memory in the United States, because
we don't think we have any.").
189. Id.
190. J.R. Spencer, The Case for a Code of Criminal Procedure, 2000 CRIM. L. REv.
519,522.
191. Darbyshire, supra note 187, § 4-006 (citing 1997 White Paper, Rights Brought
Home).
192. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms art. 2,
Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 (entered into force Sept. 3, 1953) [hereinafter ECHR],
available at http://conventions.coe.int/treaty/en/Treaties/Html/005.htm (last visited Oct. 4,
2006). Taking these decisions "into account" is not necessarily the same as a binding
precedent. Darbyshire, supra note 187, § 1-022.
193. ECHR Article 6 provides in full that:
1. In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge
against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable
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procedures surrounding unlawful deprivation of liberty 194 (Art. 5). The

time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law. Judgment shall be
pronounced publicly by the press and public may be excluded from all or part of the
trial in the interest of morals, public order or national security in a democratic
society, where the interests of juveniles or the protection of the private life of the
parties so require, or the extent strictly necessary in the opinion of the court in
special circumstances where publicity would prejudice the interests of justice.
2. Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until
proved guilty according to law.
3. Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum rights:
(a) to be informed promptly, in a language which he understands and in detail, of the
nature and cause of the accusation against him;
(b) to have adequate time and the facilities for the preparation of his defence;
(c) to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing or, if
he has not sufficient means to pay for legal assistance, to be given it free when the
interests of justice so require;
(d) to examine or have examined witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance
and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses
against him;
(e) to have the free assistance of an interpreter if he cannot understand or speak the
language used in court.
ECHR, supra note 192, art. 6.
194. ECHR Article 5 provides in full that:
1. Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person.
2. No one shall be deprived of his liberty save in the following cases and in
accordance with a procedure prescribed by law:
(a) the lawful detention of a person after conviction by a competent court;
(b) the lawful arrest or detention of a person for non-compliance with the lawful
order of a court or in order to secure the fulfillment of any obligation prescribed
by law;
(c) the lawful arrest or detention of a person effected for the purpose of bringing
him before the competent legal authority of reasonable suspicion of having
committed and offence or when it is reasonably considered necessary to prevent
his committing an offence or fleeing after having done so;
(d) the detention of a minor by lawful order for the purpose of educational
supervision or his lawful detention for the purpose of bringing him before the
competent legal authority;
(e) the lawful detention of persons for the prevention of the spreading of
infectious diseases, of persons of unsound mind, alcoholics or drug addicts, or
vagrants;
(f) the lawful arrest or detention of a person to prevent his effecting an
unauthorized entry into the country or·of a person against whom action is being
taken with a view to deportation or extradition.
3. Everyone who is arrested shall be informed promptly, in a language which he
understands, of the reasons for his arrest and the charge against him.
4. Everyone arrested or detained in accordance with the provisions of paragraph
1(c) of this article shall be brought promptly before a judge or other officer
authorized by law to exercise judicial power and shall be entitled to trial within a
reasonable time or to release pending trial. Release may be conditioned by
guarantees to appear for trial.
5. Everyone who is deprived of his liberty by arrest or detention shall be entitled to
take proceedings by which the lawfulness of his detention shall be decided speedily
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technical due process embodied in Article 6 is by far the most common
application of these rights. 195
While a U .K. citizen's rights seem straightforward under the
Convention, the actual procedure afforded is not always as clear. U.K.
criminal procedure is dispersed throughout 150 different statutes
spanning the better portion of two centuries. 196 Additionally, a large
portion of the law of evidence has no statutory basis at all. 197 This has
made the law of criminal procedure in the U.K. largely inaccessible to
the public 198 and a "nightmare to apply for judges, magistrates' clerks
and practicing lawyers." 199 Multiple campaigns for reform have been
brought about and there exists a push for the drafting of a
comprehensive code of criminal procedure. 200 These changes did not

by a court and his release ordered if the detention is not lawful.
6. Everyone who has been the victim of arrest or detention in contravention of the
provisions of this article shall have an enforceable right to compensation.
ECHR, supra note 192, art. 5.
195. ROBIN C.A. WHITE, THE ENGLISH LEGAL SYSTEM IN ACTION: ADMINISTRATION OF
JUSTICE § 4-005 (2000) (citing G. Chambers, Practicing Human Rights: U.K. lawyers and
the European Convention on Human Rights, the Law Society Research and Policy Planning
Unit Research Study No. 28 (London: the Law Society) (explaining that over half the
applications against the U.K. were made under this article)).
196. J.R. Spencer, The Case for a Code of Criminal Procedure, 2000 CRIM. L. REV.
519, 520. This is, of course, with the notable exception of the Justices of the Peace Act of
1361, which is still in force. Id.; WHITE, supra note 195, § 4-002. The Law Commission, in
its 2000 survey, found: "207 Acts of Parliament devoted to criminal procedure and/or
evidence, the earliest enacted in 1795; 64 pieces of secondary legislation containing rules
that differed according to whether they governed summary proceedings or those on
indictment - 271 different sources of law, procedure and evidence, not including case law or
guidance from the Lord Chief Justice or the Attorney General." LORD JUSTICE AULD, A
REVIEW OF THE CRIMINAL COURTS OF ENGLAND AND w ALES § 272 (2001) [hereinafter
AULD REPORT], available at http://www.criminal-courts-review.org. uk/ccr-1 O.htm.
197. Spencer, supra note 196, at 520.
198. See AULD REPORT, supra note 196.
199. Darbyshire, supra note 187, § 10-001.
200. AULD REPORT, supra note 196. Several commissions have evaluated the need for
a criminal procedure code. Id. For example, the Royal Commission on Criminal Procedure
of 1981 took note of the problem and produced the Police and Criminal Evidence Act. Id.
Again, the Royal Commission on Criminal Justice of 1993, produced the Criminal Justice
and Public Order Act 1994, the Criminal Appeal Act of 1995, and the Criminal Procedure
and Investigations Act of 1996. Id. In 1997 the Narey Report reviewed the system and
came up with the Crime and Disorder Act of 1998. Id.
Finally, after the success of the Woolf reforms on the civil justice system, Justice Auld
conducted a similar comprehensive review of the criminal system and concluded that a
single, comprehensive code of Criminal Procedure was sorely needed. AULD REPORT, supra
note 196. In his report the Lord Justice characterizes the current law as problematic because
"[f]inding the right source or sources can be a time-taking and confusing task for judges and
experienced criminal law practitioners. And, having found them, the content is often
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occur as part of the government's organized crime agenda. Yet, in order
to truly have a "21st Century Strategy to Defeat Organized Crime,"
perhaps the first step to reform is procedure and evidence.
The current U .K. laws recognize limited instances where offenses
and defendants can be joined into a single trial. In general, current U.K.
procedure follows the restrictive English common law view that a trial
should consist of one defendant answering for a single offense.

4.

Joinder of Offenses Under Current U.K. Law

The joinder and severance of offenses is controlled by Rule 9 of
the Indictment Rules of 1971, which provides that joinder is proper if
the counts are "founded on the same facts, or form or are part of a series
of offenses that are of the same or similar character. " 201
The
formulation of the rule is similar to the Federal Rules formulation, with
the notable exception that Federal Rule 8(a) allows joinder of offenses
that are part of a "common scheme or plan." 202 Thus, the joinder of
offenses in the U.K. should represent a more restrictive system than
under the Federal Rules. Yet, courts have stretched the language of the
rule, particularly the "same or similar character" requirement, to
effectuate j oinder akin to what one would expect under the Federal
Rules. For example, in Ludlow v. Metropolitan Police Commissioner, a
defendant was charged with one count of attempted theft and one count
of robbery that allegedly took place sixteen days later. 203 While the
crimes charged were similar in law, the only factual similarity was that
both offenses were committed in public houses (read: pubs). One
offense was an attempt to rob a public house, and another was
seemingly a dispute over a bar tab. The court held that in order to be
properly joined under the rule, there must be a nexus between the
offenses. The offenses must be similar in fact and law. Surprisingly,
the court went on to hold that joinder was proper in Ludlow and that the
similar location would suffice as a nexus, however slight, between the

impenetrable and sometimes leads to conflicting decisions." Id. ~ 273. Furthermore, "[flew
of these sources, standing on their own, represent the whole law or the current law on any
particular aspect, many of them being subject to piecemeal amendment, often by several
more recent instruments." Id. ~ 272. The ultimate cost of this disorder is borne by the tax
payers who pay for the cost of the additional research, injustice, and loss of public
confidence. Id. ~ 273.
201. Rule 9 reads in full: "Charges for any offenses may be joined in the same
indictment if those charges are founded on the same facts, or form or are a part of a series of
offenses of the same or a similar character." Indictment Rules, 1971, r. 9 (U.K.).
202. FED. R. CRIM. P. 8(a); see supra note 20 (quoting the rule in full).
203. Ludlow v. Metro. Police Comm'r, [1971] A.C. 29 (H.L.) (U.K.).
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facts. 204
Even when the offenses have been properly joined under this rule,
the judge has discretion to order a separate trial where he is "of the
opinion that a person accused may be prejudiced or embarrassed in his
defense by reason of being charged with more than one offence in the
same indictment. " 205 The courts have added to this requirement, tacking
on the additional requisites that the severance must be in the "interests
of justice" and premised upon some "special feature" that makes the
joinder of the offenses prejudicial. 206
The rules of joinder and severance are often read in tandem with
the rules of evidence in order to determine whether a joint trial is
proper. 207 In particular, the English common law upholds a general
prohibition of "similar fact" evidence, that is, the prosecution may not

204. Id.
205. Indictments Act, 1915, § 5(3) (U.K.). The section reads in full:
(4) Where, before trial, or at any stage of a trial, the court is of the opinion that the
postponement of the trial of a person accused is expedient as a consequence of the
exercise of any powers of the court under this Act to amend an indictment or to
order a separate trial as appears necessary.
( 5) Where an order of the court is made under this section for the postponement of a
trial(a) if such order is made during a trial the court may order that the jury are to be
discharged from giving a verdict on the count or counts the trial of which is
postponed or on the indictment, as the case may be; and
(b) the procedure on the separate trial of a count shall be the same in all respects
as if the count had been found in a separate indictment, and the procedure on the
postponed trial shall be the same in all respects (if the jury has been discharged)
as if the trial had not commenced; and
(c) the court may make such order as to granting the accused person bail and as
to the enlargement of recongisances and otherwise as the court thinks fit.
Indictments Act§ 5(3).
206. Ludlow v. Metro. Police Comm'r, [1971] A.C. 29, 41 (H.L.) (U.K.). Ludlow
represents the leading case regarding joinder of offenses. There the House of Lords held
that one count of attempted larceny and one count of robbery were properly joined, despite
that the only factual similarity was that both offenses were committed in public houses in
west London. Id. at 30, 41.
207. Dir. of Pub. Prosecutions v. Boardman, [1975] A.C. 421, 449 (H.L.) (U.K.).
There, Lord Cross stated that:
If the charges are tried together it is inevitable that the jurors will be influenced,
consciously or unconsciously, by the fact that the accused being charged not with a
single offence against one person but with three separate offences against three
persons. It is said, I know, that to order separate trials in all these cases would be
highly inconvenient. If and so far as this is true it is reason for doubting the wisdom
of the general rules excluding similar fact evidence. But so long as there is that
general rule the court ought to strive to give effect to it loyally and not, while paying
lip service to it, in effect let in the inadmissible evidence by trying all of the charges
together.
Id. at 459.
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adduce evidence of previous or subsequent bad conduct of the accused
other than those relating to the offence charged. 208 The rationale for this
rule is that "similar fact" evidence is both irrelevant for showing guilt
and, insofar as the evidence is relevant, its highly inflammatory nature
outweighs its relevancy. 209 Joinder of offenses has the effect of
allowing evidence to be put to the jury that would not have been
In certain
admissible if the offenses had been tried alone.
circumstances, this consideration alone is enough to prove that
severance should be granted. 210
Still, severance is a sparingly granted relief. 211 Because the
Indictment Rules grant broad discretion to the trial judge, a ruling on
severance is difficult, if not impossible to overtum. 212 The more
common relief granted is a jury instruction directing the jurors that they
may not use the evidence on one count to support that on another. 213

208. See, e.g., R v. Brown, (1963) 47 Crim. App. 204 (holding that evidence of one
participant pleading guilty to one count of ship-breaking was not admissible in a trial for a
break-in that occurred five days later since there was no idiosyncratic features to link the
two offenses); R v. Taylor, (1923) 17 Crim. App. 109 (holding that the accused possession
of a burglary device found several days after the charged offense was committed was
inadmissible because it tended to prove disposition and not culpability).
209. The prohibition of "similar fact" evidence is the British analogue to Rule 404(b)
which provides:
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of
a person in order to show action in conformity therewith. It may, however, be
admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent,
preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident, provided
that upon request by the accused, the prosecution in a criminal case shall provide
reasonable notice in advance of trial, or during trial if the court excuses pretrial
notice on good cause shown, of the general nature of any such evidence it intends to
introduce at trial.
FED. R. Evm. 404(b). Compare with Boardman, [1975] A.C. at 462 (stating what has
become the classical common law test that "if the crime charged is committed in a uniquely
or strikingly similar manner to other crimes committed by the accused the manner in which
the other crimes were committed may be evidence upon which a jury could reasonably
conclude that the accused was guilty.").
210. See, e.g., R v. Brooks, (1991) 92 Crim. App. 36 (ruling that after the trial courts
decision that evidence on three counts of incest was not admissible, the trial court should
have granted a severance); R v. Sims, [1946] K.B. 531. Normally these certain
circumstances include counts of sexual offences, which are often considered to be so
scandalous and prejudicial that they cannot be tried with other charges. Brooks, 92 Crim.
App. at 42.
211. LAW CoMM'N, LAW COM No. 273, EVIDENCE OF BAD CHARACTER AT CRIMINAL
PROCEEDINGS 2.91 (2001), available at http://www.lawcom.gov.uk/lc_reports.htm.
212. Ludlow v. Metro. Police Comm'r, [1971] 1 A.C. 29, 41 (H.L.) (U.K.).
213. Auld Report, supra note 196, ~ 2.95.
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Joinder of Offenders Under Current U.K. Law

The indictment may include separate counts and name different
defendants in each count. 214 The joint trial of these counts and
defendants is not subject to any specific statutory rule: joinder of
offenders is defined solely by practice. The seminal case controlling
joint trials is R v. Assim. 215 There two defendants, both employees of
the same night club, were involved in an altercation when a customer
attempted to leave the club without paying. 216 One defendant was
charged with unlawfully wounding one customer, and his co-defendant
was charged with assault occasioning actual bodily harm. 217 Since the
charges were committed against two separate defendants, they were,
necessarily, charged in two separate counts. 218 The court in Assim
assumed without deciding that the Indictment Rules of 1915, by its
plain language, only applied to joinder of offenses. 219 In the absence of
a statute, the court can use its "inherent power both to formulate its own
rules and to vary them in the light of current experience and the needs
of justice." According to the court, the history of the joint trials did not
provide guidance, as the prominent publicists of the time and previous
decisions did not provide a clear benchmark by which to measure the
appropriateness of a joint trial. 220 Thus, the court enunciated that

214. See, e.g., R v. Assim, (1966) 50 Crim. App. 224.
215 . Practice Direction [ 1971].
216. Assim, 50 Crim. App. at 225-26.
217. Id. at 225.
218. Id. at233.
219. Id.
220. Id. at 234. The court went on to say that:
[O]n an examination of the authorities, this court considers that there never has been
a clear, settled and general practice based on principle as to the occasions when
joinder of offenders is in the practice correct: moreover, there may well have been
wide fluctuations as to what might be called the terminal limits at any one time of
the application of the practice then in force. Indeed, as regards past centuries this
absence of settled practice is reflected in the variations of views between eminent
writers, as for instance those expressed in the 1778 and 1800 editions of Hale's
Pleas of the Crown, pp. 174 and 175 and the 1824 edition of Hawkins ' Pleas of the
Crown, pp. 331 and 332.
Id. In light of the finding that no rule of joinder existed, the court, quite generously, took
upon themselves the burden of making one up. The courts reference to Hale and Hawkins
here is perhaps disingenuous. Hale's pleas of the crown does not represent an aberration
from the ordinary rule of joinder of principles and accessories in the same indictment, for
the same crime. His seminal treatise says:
But yet the principle and accessory being indicted by one or several indictments, and
both appearing they may be arraigned at the same time and both pleading not guilty,
the same jury shall charged with both and directed to inquire of both, viz. first of the
principle.
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whether "the matters which constitute the individual offences of the
several offenders are upon the available evidence so related, whether in
time or by other factors, that the interests of justice are best served by
their being tried together," then the defendants can be properly tried
together, subject always to the ever-present discretion of the court. 221
The Assim court thus opted for an extremely flexible standard
("interests of justice") rather than a rigid rule.
The problems with an "interests of justice" test are patent. First, it
provides little guidance on what "justice" entails and whose "justice"
should be served. In determining "justice," courts seem to look to a
myriad of factors: whether separate trials could lead to inconsistent
verdicts, 222 whether a separate trial would prejudice either the
prosecution or the defense, convenience to the witnesses, 223 potential for
prejudice in a joint trial, overlapping evidence, and the wishes of the
defendants. Secondly, the "interests of justice" test, while paying lip
service to the value of consistency of verdicts, does not itself produce
consistent results. 224 The rule in Assim is read to tolerate some
prejudice in application, allowing evidence into a joint trial that would
not have been admissible against one or more defendants tried alone.
The quantum of prejudice required to overturn a denial of severance is
variable. Thirdly, inconsistent results are rarely overturned. The Court
of Appeals interferes only if it can be shown that the trial judge ignored
relevant decisions, took account of irrelevant decisions, or arrived at a

MATHEW HALE, 2 HISTORIA PIACITORUM CORONAE, THE HISTORY OF THE PLEAS OF THE
CROWN 222 (1847).
The later references to Hawkin's dissenting view of joinder is also flawed, primarily in that
later editions do not include this quote. Thus, sometime between 1824 and May 8, 1966,
when Assim was decided, Hawkin's (or his editor) changed his mind. Further, a reading of
Archibald indicates that a rule of joinder existed as far back as 1867. The rule is that
individuals who jointly commit a criminal act whether "robbery, burglary, or murder, they
may be indicted for is jointly." Participation in the act is what is essential under this
reading, andjoinder is not exclusively to acts of robbery, burglary and murder. JON JERVIS,
ET AL., ARCHBOLD's PLEADING AND EVIDENCE IN CRIMINAL CASES 62-64 (16th ed. 1867).
Again, "[ w]here several persons join in the commission of an offence they may be jointly or
separately indicted for it." HENRY w. DISNEY & HAROLD GUNDRY, THE CRIMINAL LAW: A
SKETCH OF ITS PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE 51 (1895). Thus a rule did exist, however rigid it
may appear to be, and the rule clearly said what we would think of in modern terms as an
"act or transaction" test.
221. Id.
222. ARCHIBOLD'S PLEADING AND EVIDENCE 155-157 (22nd Ed. 2004).
223. R v. Crawford, [1997] 1 W.L.R. 1329; R v. Edwards, [ 1998] Crim. L.R. 756; R v.
Grondkowski, [1946] K.B. 369; R. v. Moghal, (1977) 65 Cr.App. 56.
224. R v. O'Boyle, (1990) 92 Cr.App. 202; R v. Randle [1995] Crim. L.R. 331.
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manifestly unreasonable decision. 225

6.

Overloading the Indictment

A fair reading of Assim could imply that perhaps joinder is more
liberally applied in the U.K. than the U.S. In fact, the Assim opinion
(and corresponding practice direction) are subject to an additional
caveat. A trial judge must also consider whether trying a single
indictment would result in an unduly complicated trial and would place
undue burden on the jury. The generally followed rule is derived from
dicta in the case of R v. Novae and its resulting practice direction. 226 In
Novae, four defendants were tried on nineteen counts, each pleading not
guilty. 227 Three of the defendants were linked via an overarching
conspiracy count, specifically the conspiracy to procure males under 21
to commit acts of indecency, and various substantive offences relating
to the conspiracy. 228 A fourth defendant was tried on roughly similar
charges related to the conspiracy, but not membership in the
conspiracy. 229 The trial lasted forty-seven working days and required a
four to five day summing up. 230 Ultimately, many of the convictions
were quashed because of errors in similar-fact evidence and
corroboration. 231 Lord Justice Bridge concluded that "the indictment of
19 counts against four defendants resulting in unnecessary length and
complexity. " 232 He went on to find that:
Quite apart from the question whether the prosecution could find legal
justification for joining all these counts in one indictment and resisting
severance, the wider and more important question is whether in such a
case the interests of justice were likely to be better served by one very
long trial, or by one moderately long and four very short separate
trials ...
Some criminal prosecutions involve consideration of matters so
plainly inextricable and indivisible that a long and complex trial is an
ineluctable necessity. But we are convinced that nothing short of the
criterion of absolute necessity can justify the imposition of the

225. R v. Grondkowski, [1946] K.B. 369 (affirming joinder even though all members
of the court strongly indicated that they would not have joined the defendants).
226. Practice Direction (Crime: Conspiracy) [1977] 1 W.L.R. 537.
227. R v. Novae, (1977) 65 Cr.App. 107.
228. Id.
229. Id.
230. Id.
231. Id.
232. ARCHIBOLD'S PLEADING AND EVIDENCE 167 (22nd ed. 2000).
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burdens of a very long trial on the court. 233

As a result of the court's clear statement of preference for shorter, more
straightforward trials, a practice direction was issued.
The practice direction provides that in an indictment containing
both substantive and conspiracy counts, "the judge should require the
prosecution to justify joinder, or, failing justification, to elect whether to
proceed on the substantive or on conspiracy counts."234 The practice
direction has worked to create simple trials, where one offender
answering for a single offense is the rule, and joinder is the exception. 235
That this rule is alive and well in English law is evidenced by the
courts tersely worded opinion in Ke/lard, the case that has the "ignoble
distinction" of being England's longest jury trial. 236 The trial lasted 252
working days and involved four defendants charged with twenty-nine
counts relating to fraudulent trading and conspiracy to defraud. While
the length and complexity of trial alone was not dispositive of a
miscarriage of justice, the court went on to rebuke the prosecutor
because it was his "duty ... to review the evidence in a long case and

233. Id.
234. Practice direction (Crime: Conspiracy) [1971] 64 Cr. App. R. 258. In any case
where an indictment contains substantive counts and a relating conspiracy count, the judge
should require the prosecution to justify joinder, or, failing justification, to elect whether to
proceed on the substantive or on the conspiracy counts. "A joinder is justified for this
purpose if the judge considers that the interests of justice demand it." [1997] 1 W.L.R. at
537.
The need for simplicity in the presentation of the case was echoed by Lawton L.J. in the
context of the length of the indictment in Thome when he said:
This Court has noticed a tendency recently for prosecuting counsel to overload
indictments. There must be an end to this. Indictments must be kept short. No more
accused should be indicted together than is necessary for the proper presentation of
the ... case . . . . Necessity, not convenience, should be the guiding factor.
R v. Thome, (1978) 66 Cr.App. 6, 12. Later, "[a]ll that can be said with confidence is that
the indictment was overloaded, far too many lengthy submissions were made and too much
time was spent by counsel in addressing the jury. Counsel must curb their verbosity." Id. at
14. Similar observations by the same leamedjudge were made in the case of Landy, White
and Kay (1981) 72 Cr.App.R. 237. The most recent authority, and in some respects the
most relevant to the present appeal, is the case of Cohen. This decision is not fully reported
and we proceed by reference to the transcript. The length of the trial was described as
"awesome" as it covered 184 days, a shorter period than that taken by the trial in the present
case. Peter Hutchesson, R v. Cohen and Others, 142 N.L.J. 1267 (1992).
235. For example, consider the thirty longest cases heard between 2003 and 2004. The
average length of these "very long" trials was 67 days (still relatively short by U.S .
comparison). An average of six defendants was tried in these cases. The jury heard
testimony from an average of 114 witnesses. DEPARTMENT OF CONSTITUTIONAL AFFAIRS, A
FAIRER
DEAL
FOR
LEGAL
Am,
2005,
5.5,
available
at
http://www.dca.gov.uk/laid/laidfullpaper.pdf [hereinafter A FAIRER DEAL FOR LEGAL Am].
236. R v. Kellard, (1995) 2 Crim.App. 134, 140.
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decide how much of it, even though relevant, [could] be withheld in the
interests of time and clarity." 237 The preference of the common law of
joinder, even today, is to preserve the trial unit as one defendant
answering for a single offence. The practice direction, which requires
severance of conspiracy and substantive counts, actively works against
one trial of all of the participants of large scale criminal venture, in
short, organized crime, or for that matter, terrorism.
C.

Evidence and Human Rights Implications ofJoinder

As stated in Part I, there are special evidence issues that arise in
joint trials than would otherwise arise in the context of separate
defendants tried for a single offense. In the United States, admission of
evidence in a joint trial can have constitutional implications. Admission
of one defendant's confession in a joint trial against the defendant and
his co-conspirators can give rise to Confrontation Clause issues, more
specifically termed a Bruton problem. 238 Additionally, when counts and

237. Id. at 146.
238. Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968). Nevertheless, confessions are
typically not an issue in sophisticated enterprise trials. The more common result is that a
potential co-defendant will "turn" and testify against his former compatriots at trial,
eliminating the Bruton problem. Even in the event that a defendant confesses and then
decided not to testify at trial, neither the English common law nor the European Court of
Human Rights would cry foul on behalf of the potentially prejudiced co-defendant. The
common law rule is that admissions and confessions are evidence only against their maker,
and not against co-defendants whom they might implicate. PETER MURPHY, MURPHY ON
EVIDENCE 298 (8th ed. 2003). On the other hand, this does not mean that confessions
implicating a co-defendants are excluded. Instead, the co-accused is entitled only to a
limiting instruction that the confession can only be used as evidence against the confessor.
Simply put: there is no Bruton rule in the U.K.. Even the editing of confessions, which is
key in the United States when the prosecution adduces a confession, is often not permitted.
The court does not have the power the edit out otherwise admissible evidence in the
accused's statement unless the prosecution and the accused consent, which is rare. Lobban
v. R, [1995] 1 W.L.R. 877, 879 (P.C. 1995) (holding that the co-accused was not entitled to
edit himself out of a co-defendants confession where the material in the confession would
have been admissible against the confessor); R v. Jefferson, (1994) 99 Crim. App. 13, 24
(holding the a co-accused could not edit incriminating statements against him, made by his
co-defendant, out of his co-defendant's information).
Furthermore, a co-defendant who might be implicated in a confession probably will not find
relief in the European Convention on Human Rights. Kostovki v. Netherlands, App. No.
11454/85, 12 Eur. H.R. Rep. 434, ~39 (1989) (holding, in part, that is the job of national
law, not the convention, to regulate domestic evidences laws).
Unlike the United States Supreme Court, the European Court of Human Rights does not
have the power "to regulate the operation of criminal procedure, including the rules of
evidence, in a State which is bound by [the Convention]." Kostovski, 12 Eur. H.R. Rep. 434,
~39.
Thus, unlike the U.S. Constitution that transcends all laws (including those of
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offenders are joined, it may have the effect of silencing otherwise
exculpatory witnesses/co-defendants by virtue of the Fifth
Amendment. 239 Finally, counts that should have been joined, but were
not, can be barred from being brought again under Blockburger and the
Double Jeopardy Clause. 240
The law of joinder itself militates against prosecuting group crime
in the U.K. In the rare case that counts are joined, however, it remains
to be seen to what extent the law of evidence, England's unwritten
constitution, and the newly applicable European Convention on Human
Rights protect defendants' rights at trial, while still providing efficient
and accurate judgments.

1.

Co-conspirator Exception to the Hearsay Rule

A joint trial, however rare, does confer some advantages on the
prosecution in U.K. trials. However objectionable a U.S. audience may
find the treatment of confessions, it is only part of the advantages
allowed to the prosecutor. Like the U.S., the U.K. also recognizes a coconspirator exception to the hearsay rule, albeit the rule is less
procedure and evidence), these rights do not directly effect domestic law, and U.K. law has
changed little since their adoption. The Convention does provide, however, that persons
have a right to a fair trial, including the "right to examine or have examined witnesses
against him."ECHR, supra note 192, art. 6.3(d).
When a defendant confesses, implicating other properly joined parties, and then declines to
take the stand, a co-defendant is left without recourse. Since the evidence is not
"admissible" against him, he cannot make a confrontation clause challenge. Yet, since
relatively little is known about the workings of the jury, he cannot be sure that the evidence,
which is also hearsay, is not being used against him in deliberations. While the Court has
not had the occasion to consider whether a confession adduced in a joint trial violates this
right, the Court has considered the admission of hearsay testimony. In Blast/and v. United
Kingdom, the Court of Human Rights considered the correctness of the hearsay rule on its
face, and concluded that rule served a relatively benign purpose and was acceptable under
the Convention. (1987) 10 EHRR 528, 531. Similarly, the U.K. Court of Appeal has
addressed this issue, holding that the accused rights to a fair trial were not violated when
hearsay statements of a person who was not called as a witness were admitted against him.
R v. Gokal, (1997) 2 Crim. App. 266. While the defendant did not have the opportunity to
confront the witnesses against him, the grant of judicial discretion and the provisions of the
hearsay rule properly protect the rights of the accused. Thus, a defendant in a joint trial will
probably face the same fate of having no recourse in a Human Rights appeal.
239. Alternatively, a co-defendant's testimony may exculpate a defendant. Because the
co-defendant may not wish to waive his 5th Amendment right and testify at trial, the
exculpatory testimony will not be heard. In this respect joinder acts to silence the witnesses
that may be the most helpful to the defendants case. For a classical explanation of this
problem, see Peter Westen, The Compulsory Process Clause, 73 MICH. L. REV. 73, 143
(1974); Russell D. Covey, Beating the Prisoner at the Prisoner's Dilemma: The Evidentiary
Value of a Witness's Refusal to Testify, 47 AM. U.L. REV. 105 (1997).
240. Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304 (1932).

https://surface.syr.edu/jilc/vol34/iss1/3

48

Gunnigle: "Birds of a Feather" Rico: Trying Partners In Crime Together

2006]

A RICO Legal Structure for the United Kingdom

89

circumscribed than its US counterpart. The rule generally proscribes
that where "the prosecution allege[ s] a common design, the acts and
declarations of [conspirators] in furtherance of the common design,
even though in absence of the other, are admissible evidence against
both to prove the existence and carrying out of the common design." 241
The exception applies whether or not a crime was committed to further
the conspiracy, and whether or not the maker of the statement was
jointly tried and indicted. 242 Nevertheless, because the U.K. strongly
favors small trials with minimal joinder of defendants, these advantages
are rarely used.

2.

The Police and Criminal Evidence Act

On December 15, 2004, a new law came into effect in the U.K. that
dramatically changed the admissibility of "bad character" evidence. 243
Under the new statutory scheme, evidence of previous convictions and
other reprehensible conduct can be adduced as evidence of the
defendant's propensity to commit crimes of the kind charged. 244 This
change will likely aid the prosecutors to obtain convictions of repeat
offenders. Further, the Criminal Justice Act 2003 contains provisions
unique to multi-defendant trials. Under section 101 (e) a co-defendant
can introduce evidence of another defendant's bad character when such
evidence has "substantial probative value in relation to an important

241. MURPHY, supra note 237, at 8.2.2.l; ARCHBOLD, supra note 221, § 34-60.
242. MURPHY, supra note 237, at 8.2.2.2; ARCHBOLD, supra note 221, § 34-60.
243. Criminal Justice Act, 2003, c. 44, §§ 98-110, 112; R v. Bradley (2005), 1 Crim.
App. 24 (Eng.) (holding that the provisions of the act applied to all trials and Newton
hearings begun on or after the 15 December 2004).
244. Criminal Justice Act 2003 § 98. That section defines bad character as evidence of,
or of a disposition towards, misconduct on his part, other than evidence which (a) has to do
with the alleged facts of the offence with which the defendant is charged, or (b) is evidence
of misconduct in connection with the investigation or prosecution of that offence. Id.
Under the new scheme "bad character evidence" is admissible in seven circumstances:
(1) In criminal proceedings evidence of the defendant's bad character is admissible
if, but only ifa. all parties to the proceedings agree to the evidence being admissible,
b. the evidence is adduced by the defendant himself or is given in answer to a
question asked by him in cross-examination and intended to elicit it,
c. it is important explanatory evidence,
d. it is relevant to an important matter in issue between the defendant and the
prosecution,
e. it has substantial probative value in relation to an important matter in issue
between the defendant and a co-defendant,
f. it is evidence to correct a false impression given by the defendant, or
g. the defendant has made an attack on another person's character.
Id. § 101.
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matter in issue between the defendant and a co-defendant. " 245 This
provision aims to codify and liberalize the often murky law in cases
where co-defendants are running "cutthroat" defenses. 246 The provision
provides that if the nature of one defendant's defense is to undermine
the other, than evidence of the other defendants' "bad character" as to
truthfulness is admissible. 247 While courts have not had the occasion to
interpret the provision, commentators and drafters generally agree that
the test for admissibility (probative value in relation to an important
matter in issue), which is a new concept in U .K. evidence law, will
"likely to be interpreted [to mean] only as more than merely trivial."248
Thus, defendants are able, and even encouraged, to act as a second
prosecutor and adduce evidence against a co-defendant at trial. This
section represents a substantial departure from the previous law
regarding co-defendants and character evidence. While its effect
remains to be seen, the Criminal Justice Act 2003 has the potential to
change the landscape of group trials in the U .K.

3.

Inadmissibility of Wiretap Evidence

Up to this point, this Article has discussed nuances of U .K.
evidence law that aid in the prosecution of criminal enterprises. Our
common law neighbors have more liberal evidence rules regarding
confessions, hearsay, and character evidence than the US. For that
reason, the U.K. law with respect to wiretap evidence seems particularly
draconian. In the U.K., evidence obtained from domestic wiretaps is
inadmissible. 249 The Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000

245. Criminal Justice Act 2003 § lOl(e).
246. Crown Prosecution Service, Bad Character Evidence (2004), available at
http://www.cps.gov.uk/legal/section13/chapter_uhtml#content (last visited July 17, 2005);
ANDREW KOEGH, EVIDENCE OF BAD CHARACTER UNDER THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE ACT 19
(2003 ), available at http://www.crimeline.info/badcharacter.pdf (last visited July 17, 2005).
247. "A matter in issue between the defendant and a co-defendant" is defined as:
( 1) Evidence which is relevant to the question whether the defendant has a
propensity to be untruthful is admissible on that basis under section 101 (1 )( e) only if
the nature or conduct of his defence is such as to undermine the co-defendant's
defence.
(2) Only evidencea. which is to be (or has been) adduced by the co-defendant, or
which a witness is to be invited to give (or has given) in cross-examination by
the co-defendant,
b. is admissible under section lOl(l)(e).
Criminal Justice Act 2003 § 104.
248. Crown Prosecution Service, supra note 246; see also KEOGH, supra note 245, at
19.
249. l.H. DENNIS, THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 269-272 (2d ed. 2002); RICHARD MAY,
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(RIPA) criminalizes the intentional interception of a communication
without lawful authority in the course of transmission by means of a
public telephone system. 250 The statute confers power to the Secretary
of State to issue a warrant authorizing wiretapping when it is deemed
necessary for the purposes of protecting the U .K. 's national security or
economic well-being, or for the purposes of detecting serious crime. 251
The Home Office claims that their use of wiretapping has prevented and
disrupted terrorists and is widely used against drug rings. 252 In 2003,
the interceptions led to:
• seizure of 26 tons of illicit drugs;
• seizure of 10 tons of tobacco;
• detection of £390m of financial crime; and
• 1,680 arrests. 253
Thus, wiretapping is widely used in the U .K. pursuant to the RIP A
warrant process, but its use is restricted to intelligence and not
admissible in a court of law. 254
Paradoxically, evidence obtained from domestic microphone
surveillance ("bugging") is admissible. 255 Evidence obtained via
CRIMINAL EVIDENCE § 2-21 (4th ed. 2005).
250. Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act, 2000, c. 23, § 1(1) (Eng.) [hereinafter
RIPA].
251. RIPA § 5(2)-(3). Those sections provide in full:
(2) The Secretary of State shall not issue an interception warrant unless he
believesa. that the warrant is necessary on the ground falling within subsection (3); and
b. that the conduct authorized by the warrant is proportionate to what is sought
to be achieved by that conduct.
(3) Subject to the following provisions of this section, a warrant is necessary on
grounds falling within this subsection if it is necessarya. in the interests of national security;
b. for the purpose of preventing or detecting serious crime;
c. for the purpose of safeguarding the economic well-being of the United
Kingdom; or
d. for the purpose, in circumstances appearing to the Secretary of State to be
equivalent to those in which he would issue a warrant by virtue of paragraph (b),
by giving effect to the provisions of any international mutual assistance
agreement.
Id. § 5(2)-(3).
Office,
Frequently
Asked
Questions,
252. Home
http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/terrorism/faq/atcsa?faq.html#l (last visited July 17, 2005)
[hereinafter Frequently Asked Questions].
253. Id.
254. Morgans v. Dir. Of Pub. Prosecution, [2001] 1 A.C. 315 (U.K.).
255. R v. Khan (Sultan), [1997] A.C. 558, 582 (U.K.) (admitting evidence obtained by
bugging despite that the bugging operation constituted a civil trespass); l.H. DENNIS, THE
LAW OF EVIDENCE 269-272 (2d ed. 2002).
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wiretapping in another country is also admissible. 256 Yet, the wealth of
wiretap information obtained under the RIP A procedures cannot be used
as evidence. The rationale proffered for this curious rule is that, by
bringing covertly obtained evidence into the judicial process,
intelligence agencies would have to reveal sensitive sources and
methods of surveillance. 257 Some argue that the court use of intercepted
information would discourage serious criminals and terrorists from
using the phone, thereby drying up a crucial source of information. 258
256. R v. Aujla, [1998] 2 Crim. App. 16 (U.K.) (holding that evidence obtained from a
Dutch wiretap place on telephone in the Netherlands and authorized by the Dutch authorities
was admissible to prove a violation of British law in a U.K. court).
257. Regina v. P, [2002] 1 A.C. 146 (U.K.); Frequently Asked Questions, supra note
238. The Home Office, on their public website, explains this incongruent rule. The site
states that:
Our intelligence only approach, based on decades of dealing with terrorism, brings
with it uniquely close co-operation between law enforcement and intelligence
agencies. No other country in the world even gets close to this level of co-operation.
None of those involved in this work here would be willing simply to swap our
approach for any of the evidential schemes operating elsewhere.
Id. Moves have been made to change this rule and adopt legislation that would allow
wiretap evidence to be used in court. Specifically, a report last summer advocated for a
three-tier warrant system issuing intelligence only, non-evidential, and evidential warrant,
the latter requiring judicial authorization. The report concluded that such a law would result
in a modest increase in convictions for some serious criminals, but not terrorists. Press
Release, Charles Clarke, Sec'y of State for the Home Dep't, U.K.: Statement by the Home
Secretary on the "interception of communications" (Jan. 26, 2005), available at
http://www.statewatch.org/news/2005/jan/1 luk-intercepts-evidence.htm; see also 430 PARL.
DEB., H.C. (6th ser.) (2005) 1238 (statement of Mr. Mitchell). There, Mr. Mitchell
remarked that right balance had not been struck with respect to effectiveness of intelligence
services and the public interest in prosecuting certain cases. He said that:
[U]nder the [proposed] clause, relaxing the ban [on wiretap evidence] would not
place an obligation on the prosecution to use intercept evidence. It would simply
allow the submission of intercept evidence in court and stand on a par with what is
available to other agencies dealing with serious crime and terrorism. What is more,
there are already eclectic and disparate cases in which intercept evidence is used in
criminal courts, albeit as an exception to the general rule, and there has not been any
damage to police or intelligence service operational capabilities and methodology. I
submit that these experiences puncture the Government's objections to the use of
intercept evidence and render the present state of the law in this area quite ludicrous.
Id. To date, none of these reform efforts have been successful in altering this "ludicrous"
and "disparate" rule.
258. In debates before the House of Commons the Rt. Hon. Tom Harris justified the
rule based on the experience in America with wiretaps. There he said:
I want to address the issue of wire tap or intercept evidence . . . . The security
services were extremely concerned that a crucial source of counter-terrorist
information would dry up if wiretap evidence were permissible in court.
Let us look at the American example. In many states in America where wire tap is
allowed, that source of information has all but dried up because criminalsmembers of the mafia and terrorists-understand that this that they say on the
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Neither of these rationales can fully account for the U.K.'s
"ludicrous" and "disparate" use of wiretap information. First, those
who engage in organized crime or terrorism use circumspection when
using the telephone, or for that matter, any form of communication.
They are cautious because they might be under government
surveillance, not because those statements might later be used in court.
For this reason, wiretap evidence in the U.S. has not "dried up."
Secondly, as the American experience with wiretapping has
demonstrated, sensitive sources and methods can be protected without
The Classified
sacrificing this important source of evidence.
Information Procedures Act (CIPA) 259 is one possible model that
provides for in camera, ex parte review of sensitive sources and
methods.
As the Home Office freely admits, wiretapping is used and is a
fruitful source of information. That important source of information is
not used in court proceedings and is a waste of valuable resources that
could be used to bring criminals to justice.
IV.

THE "RICIN PLOT:" A CASE STUDY OF BRITISH JUSTICE

Lord Woolf, in an article for the Times, recently quipped that "the
standards of justice that the system is delivering are no better than that
which were provided ... 50 years ago." 260 The Lord Chief Justice is
correct, but for altogether different reasons than he supposed. The
practice direction, 261 the proposed criminal justice reforms, 262 and
judge's preferences263 for trials of limited scope and length frustrate the
telephone will inevitably be used against them in court, and are extremely careful
not to say anything on the telephone. This is exactly why, I am glad, the
Government have been very reluctant to conclude that the law should change.
430 PARL. DEB., H.C. 1441 (2005) (statement of Rt. Hon. Tom Harris) (emphasis added).
259. 18 U.S.C. App. §1-16 (2004).
260. Lord Woolf, The Standards of Justice We Deliver Are No Better than 50 Years
Ago. Why?, TIMES (London), April 5, 2005, at 4. The Lord Chief Justice goes on to state
that the problem with the system is an influx of long and complex criminal fraud cases.
These cases, he argues, should be "strictly confined" to a given time frame. He states that
"there is a consensus that, save exceptional circumstances, no trial should be permitted to
exceed a give period - some favour three months, others an outer limit of six months." Id.
261. The conspiracy practice direction reads: "The judge should require the prosecution
to justify the joinder, or, failing justification, to elect whether to proceed on the substantive
or conspiracy counts. Practice Direction (Crime: Conspiracy), (1977) 1 W.L.R. 537 (Eng.).
See supra text accompanying notes 210-216.
262. See, e.g. DEPARTMENT OF CONSTITUTIONAL AFFAIRS, A FAIRER DEAL FOR LEGAL
Am, 2005, Cm. 6591 (U.K.), available at http://www.dca.gov.uk/laid/laidfullpaper.pdf
(proposing to cap the length of longer trials and encourage case management).
263. See supra text accompanying notes 234-237.
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prosecution of criminal enterprises. The paradigm of a British trial is
simple: one defendant, one offense. It is a trial system that may or may
not have been adequate for prosecuting "street crime," but it is wholly
ineffectual when prosecuting organized crime, white-collar crime, or for
that matter, the terrorist issues that the U.K. faces today. In short, one
reason why the "standards of justice" have not improved in Britain over
the last fifty years is that the trial system has not been modernized. The
recent "ricin plot" illustrates the failure of these antiquated rules of
joinder and severance to bring modern day criminals to justice.

A.

The Plot to Poison Britain

In early January 2003, a raid on a flat in North London exposed all
the makings for a chemical attack in Britain. 264 While there is yet to be
any official report of the case, the news reports revealed a plot involving
thirteen al-Qaeda operatives linked to the Abu Doha network and the
Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat in the U .K. 265 The group was
allegedly planning to make ricin and nicotine poisons to plant on car
door handles in the city. Additionally, the group had planned to taint
toiletries, like Nivea face cream and toothbrushes in local shops. 266
The plot was uncovered after one critical member was
apprehended and interrogated in Algeria. 267 With this information, the

264. Sean O'Neill, How High Street Poison Plot Ended in a Bedsit Bloodbath, TIMES
(London), April 14, 2005, at 6 [hereinafter High Street Poison Plot].
265. See David Leppard & Nick Fielding, Ricin Defendants to Claim Asylum, SUNDAY
TIMES (London), April 17, 2005, at 4. See also Sean O'Neil, Was Ricin the Last Act of
Terror Cell?, TIMES (London), April 15, 2005 at 7 [hereinafter Last Act of Terror Cell].
While not charged with crimes in the ricin case, Abu Doha is widely regarded as a "senior
terrorist," the leader of an Algerian extremist group in London, and former terrorist trainer
in Afghanistan. Id. He allegedly recruited and "mentored" Ahmed Resam, who is in U.S.
custody over the plotted millennium bomb attack on LAX, and Nizar Trabelsi, who is
currently in prison in Belgium for plotting to bomb a NATO airbase. Id. Abu Doha is being
held in Belmarsh, fighting possible extradition to the U.S .. Id.
266. Stewart Tendler & Sean O'Neill, The al-Qaeda Plot to Poison Britain, TIMES
(London), April 14, 2005, at 1 [hereinafter Al-Qaeda Plot].
267. Sean O'Neill, Informer's Arrest Brought Down Plan, TIMES (London), April 14,
2005, at 7 [hereinafter Informer's Arrest]. In December 2002, the Algerian government
detained Mohammed Meguerba, a terrorist suspect with al-Qaeda connections. Id. Under
interrogation, Meguerba revealed his plot with a man named "Nadir," with whom he
claimed to have concocted ricin. High Street Poison Plot, supra note 263. He confessed to
the Algerian authorities that the attack planned "would not be a mass attack, but on chosen
individual citizens" and that Jewish people were among the targets being considered. Id.
While Meguerba claimed not to know the address where he and "Nadir" had worked, the
information from this interrogation was enough to lead police to a North London flat. Id.

It was later revealed that this information, along with a twenty-seven page confession, was
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London police were led to a two-bedroom flat in Wood Green
containing recipes and the ingredients to manufacture ricin. The flat
contained several sets of recipes for making cyanide, ricin and other
toxins, in addition to instructions to make explosives and detonators. 268
The police also confiscated "apple pips . . . cherry stones . . . castor
beans and bottles of acetone, packets of plastic gloves, thermometers,
digital scales and funnels," in short, the ingredients for ricin and a
make-shift laboratory. 269 While ricin was not found in the flat,
investigators did uncover one pot of Nivea face cream containing a
nicotine poison. 270
Passport photos from the flat led the police to Kamel Bourgass,
identified in the interrogation in Algeria. 271 In the hours after the flat
raided, Bourgass, or "Nadir," fled to London for Bournemouth. He
allegedly spent several days with an unidentified man who authorities
believe was arranging Bourgass's escape. 272 On January 14, nine days

obtained under torture by the Algerian intelligence services (DRS). Reda Hassaine & Sean
O'Neill, I Was Tortured, Says Ricin Plotter, THE TIMES (London), May 9, 2005 at 13
[hereinafter Ricin Plotter]. Under U.K. law and multitude of international accords, a person
who commits torture is subject to criminal liability and confessions obtained under torture
are inadmissible in U.K. courts. See, e.g. R. v. Bow Street Metropolitan Stipendiary
Magistrate and others, ex parte Pinochet Ugarte, (2000) 1 A.C. 147 (H.L.) (U.K.); Police
and Criminal Evidence Act, 1984, c. 60, § 76 (U.K.) [hereinafter PACE]. U.K. statutes,
particularly PACE, contemplate the "fruit of the poisonous tree" problem and provides that
even if a confession is obtained by oppression, the admissibility of "any facts discovered as
a result of the confession" remains unaffected. PACE§ 76(4). Thus, in the criminal trial of
the ricin defendants, the evidence obtained as a result of Meguerba's tortured confession
would not be inadmissible for that reason alone. Conversely, the Special Immigration
Appeals Commission (SIAC), the only body wherein detained terrorist suspects can appeal
their detention, can accept evidence given under torture, provided that the U.K. has not
"procured or connived at" the torture. A and Others v. Secretary of State for the Home
Department [2004] EWCA (Civ) 1123, [252] (U.K.).
As the ricin case illustrates, the U.K. uses information obtained through torture for
intelligence purposes. A recent government memo has permitted M16 to use this
information, provided that no U.K. personnel took part in the torture. Robert Winnett,
Torture Ruling, SUNDAY TIMES (London), March 27, 2005, at 10.
268. High Street Poison Plot, supra note 263.
269. Id.
270. Leppard & Fielding, supra note 264. The original police report claimed to have
found ricin in the apartment. After DNA testing on the substance, police retracted the
statement as a false positive. Id.
271. High Street Poison Plot, supra note 263.
272. Id. The 100 arrests were primarily members of the Salafist Group for Preaching
and Combat (GSPC), which has sent thousands of its members to training camps in Pakistan
and Afghanistan. Kim Sengupta & Jason Bennetto, Ricin Plot: Police Made 100 Arrests to
Smash al-Qa'ida Network; Most Active Group had Sent Thousands of Members to Train,
THE INDEPENDENT (London), Apr. 14, 2005, at 5. The group is allegedly affiliated with Abu
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after the raid on the North London flat, Anti-Terrorist Branch officers
discovered and arrested both men. 273 Tragically, a botched arrest
allowed Bourgass to break free. He stabbed Detective Constable
Stephen Oake eight times before he was subdued. DC Stephen Oake
died on the scene. 274
Over 100 people were arrested in connection to the ricin plot. 275
The police action in the case cost upwards of £20 million. 276 Later,
thirteen men were charged, including Bourgass, for their involvement in
the plot. 277 The other twelve men charged were allegedly connected to
Bourgass and the al-Qaeda sponsored Salafist Group for Preaching and
Combat (GSPC), an Algerian based terrorist cell. 278

1.

Evidence of a Conspiracy

Among those arrested and tried with Bourgass was Mouloud
Sihali, a "wheelerdealer," who arranged flats and false papers for
asylum seekers in London. Upon searching his flat, the police found
five false passports, one with the picture of a key terrorist suspect. 279
This search also lead to the arrest of David Khalef, a terrorist suspect
who was in possession of a false passport and recipes to make ricin,
cyanide, and botulinum. 280
Additionally, Mustapha Taleb, an Algerian extremist, was charged
after his fingerprints were found on two sets of recipes for ricin in
He admitted to handling and
Bourgass' London apartment.
photocopying the recipes, but denied any knowledge of their contents.
Taleb was convicted and charged in his absence of terrorism crimes in
the Algeria unrelated to the ricin charge. 281 The fingerprints of Kamel

Doha who, according to a U.S. indictment, had personal permission form Osama bin Laden
to construct the Khalden training camp in Afghanistan. RICO Enterprise Concept, supra
note 51.
273. Last Act of Terror Cell, supra note 264.
274. High Street Poison Plot, supra note 263. It is unclear from the articles the extent
of the other officer's injuries. The news reports do point out that Bourgass was not
handcuffed when he was apprehended. The officers feared that handcuffing the man would
result in the destruction or contamination of possible evidence on his hands. Instead, the
officers chose to guard him on both sides; a move that proved fatal for one officer.
275. Id.
276. Leppard & Fielding, supra note 264.
277. Id.
278. High Street Poison Plot, supra note 263; Last Act of Terror Cell, supra note 264.
279. High Street Poison Plot, supra note 263.
280. Id.
281. Richard Ford, Series of Blunders Let a Terrorist Walk Free, TIMES (London), Apr.
14, 2005, at 6.
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Merzoug also were found in twenty-three places on the poison recipes.
Merzoug, a resident alien, is known for using at least two false identities
within Britain. 282

2.

The Trial(s)

Originally, thirteen men including Bourgass were indicted for
"conspiracy to make chemical or biological weapons." 283 When
secondary testing revealed that the only poison in the flat was a nicotine
poison, the charges were replaced with charges of "conspiring to cause
a public nuisance. " 284 The Crown Prosecution Service elected to try the
men in three groups: Bourgass for the murder of DC Stephen Oake, one
trial on conspiracy charges against Bourgass and eight others, and one
trial for the remaining four alleged conspirators.
Bourgass was convicted and received a life sentence for the murder
and further jail time for attempted murder and wounding. 285 In a second
trial, Bourgass and eight other men were tried on charges of "conspiracy
to cause a public nuisance by the 'use of poison or explosives to cause
disruption, fear, or in-jury [sic]"' and conspiracy to murder. 286 The
eight other men included Mustapha Taleb and Kamel Merzoug, whose
fingerprints were found extensively over the flat and ricin recipes,
David Khalef, a man found in possession of ricin recipes, and Mouloud
Sihali, the man responsible for supplying the group with false
passports. 287
Additionally, Sidali Feddag, Samir Asli, Mouloud
Bouhrama, and Khalid Alwerfeli were joined, although little is known
from the available sources of their participation in the plot. 288 Four
other men were charged in the conspiracy and awaited a second,
separate trial for their participation.

3.

Outcome of the Ricin Trial

After deliberating for more than seventy-four hours, the jury
cleared four of Bourgass' co-defendants and convicted four of

282. Id.
283. Leppard & Fielding, supra note 264.
284. See id.
285. Russell Jenkins & Stewart Tendler, Bungled Special Branch Raid Left Policeman
Dead; Ricin Plot, THE TIMES (London), Apr. 14, 2005, at 8.
286. Al-Qaeda Plot, supra note 265.
287. Leppard & Fielding, supra note 264; Ford, supra note 280; Rosie Cowan &
Duncan Campbell, Ricin Plot: Detective Murdered by Obsessive Loner: Illegal Immigrant
had Trained with al-Qaida, THE GUARDIAN, Apr. 14, 2005, at 9.
288. Al-Qaeda Plot, supra note 265.
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immigration crimes. 289 Only Bourgass was convicted in the conspiracy
charge. He was sentenced to seventeen years for his involvement. 290
The second trial of the remaining four alleged conspirators was
abandoned, and the men were officially cleared. 291
Thus, the multi-million pound investigation and trial of the "most
wanted terrorist suspect in Britain" was a bust. 292 The prosecution had
already obtained more than a life sentence for Mohammed Bourgass.
The four men convicted of passport offenses will be released soon, as
their sentences are only slightly longer than the time already served. 293
The remaining eight men cleared are in the process of seeking asylum in
the U .K. on the grounds that the ricin trial prevents them from returning
home because of probable torture. 294 A senior Scotland Yard official
said that the outcome of the trial was "disappointing," to put it mildly. 295
While the outcome of the ricin case certainly is "disappointing," it
is not entirely improbable. Since September 11, 2001, the British police
have made 702 arrests under the powers granted to them by the
Terrorism Act of 2000. 296 These arrests have produced a meager
seventeen convictions for terrorist offences. 297 The ricin case is an
illustration of need for a change in the U .K. criminal justice system. Sir
Ian Blair, the Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police, blamed the
acquittals on the lack of a substantive law to tie together "very looseknit conspiracies" and deal specifically with "acts preparatory to
terrorism. " 298
289. Id.
Mustapha Taleb and Kamel Merzoug, whose fingerprints were found
extensively over the flat and ricin recipes were completely exonerated at trial. David
Khalef, the man found in possession of ricin recipes, and Mouloud Sihali, the man
responsible for supplying the group with false passports were sentenced to 3 years and 15
months respectively for possessing false passports. Ford, supra note 280.
290. Id.
291. Id.
292. Jenkins & Tendler, supra note 284. See also Leppard & Fielding, supra note 264.
293. Al-Qaeda Plot, supra note 265.
294. Leppard & Fielding, supra note 264.
295. Id.
296. Robert Verkaik, Ricin Plot: What Now for the Terror Laws?, THE INDEPENDENT
(London), Apr. 14, 2005, at 4.
297. Id.
298. Stephen Pollard, Oh, Do Shut Up, Sir Jan, TIMES (London), Apr. 18, 2005, at 20.
The Terrorism Act of 2000 provides such an offence criminalizing acts preparatory to
terrorism. Section 57(1) states that: "A person commits an offense if he possesses an article
in circumstances which give rise to a reasonable suspicion that his possession is for a
purpose connected with the commission, preparation or instigation of an act of terrorism.
Id.; Terrorism Act of 2000, c. 11, § 57(1) (2000) (U.K.). Nevertheless, the offence does not
tie together offences and offenders, nor does it abrogate the practice direction severing the
conspiracy and substantive counts.
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The U.K. trial system, which prefers simple trials of one defendant
charged with a single crime, militates strongly against prosecuting
"loose-knit conspiracies." This approach, while serviceable when
prosecuting street crime, is utterly unworkable when faced with
terrorism crimes. The ricin case illustrates the need for a RICO-type
statute with predicate offenses tailored to the needs of a terrorism
prosecution. Such a law would modernize U .K. trial procedures and
make a single trial of an entire terrorist cell possible and appropriate.

B.

The Anatomy of a Hypothetical Ricin RICO

RICO has been a successful tool for American prosecutors faced
with the "very loose knit" conspiracies Sir Ian Blair mentions. While,
as the White Paper states, making a RICO case involves exponentially
more proof, 299 the benefits of a RICO trial are manifold. A RICO trial
would join the thirteen defendants and their diverse offenses in one trial.
A RICO trial would allow for the more liberal admission of evidence of
the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC) or al-Qaeda,
groups that all thirteen conspirators were allegedly members. 300
Because such a trial places terrorism activity in context and allows the
jury to see exactly what the defendants did, trying the ricin case as a
RICO case would have been more likely to secure convictions against
the ricin thirteen.

1.

Joinder of Offenses and Offenders

The ricin thirteen were not tried in one trial for their involvement,
most probably because they could not be. In the ricin case, the U .K.
practice direction and strong judicial preference for a short, simple trial
forced the thirteen men to be tried in three "shorter" trials. Bourgass'
trial for murder and assault were severed from the conspiracy and
passport offenses. As a result, in the second trial for conspiracy to
create a public nuisance and conspiracy, the defense portrayed the plot
as an ultimately abortive plan, carried out by men without the faculties,
intelligence, or will to kill. 301 Newspaper reports of the Bourgass' first

299. White Paper, supra note 4, at 6.01.
300. High Street Poison Plot, supra note 263; Last Act of Terror Cell, supra note 264;
Verkaik, supra note 295.
301. One commentator at the trial quipped that Bourgass "presumably intended to try
to make the stuff [ricin], but was clearly a hare-brained nut" and that his conspirators were
"no more than a bunch of illegal immigrants and passport forgers, of whom thousands must
be loose in Britain." Simon Jenkins, A Sledgehammer for a Nut, TIMES (London), Apr. 15,
2005, at 20. At trial, Bourgass was asked about a bag discovered in the flat in which the
recipes were hidden. He claimed he had found it in the street in Brixton. When asked why
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trial and conviction for murder and four counts of attempted murder
were shielded from the jury. 302 The second trial of Bourgass and eight
other men, alluded to ties with terrorist groups, suggesting that the
conspiracy was "in furtherance of [an] extremist Islamic cause" but the
ricin plotters' membership in terrorist organizations were spoken of in
veiled terms. 303 Bourgass's training at an al-Qaeda camp and the other
defendants' membership in the Salafist Group for Preaching and
Combat (GSPC) were not revealed at the trial. 304 Further, because the
conspiracy trial was severed in two, a jury never saw the full
membership of the group. 305 At trial, the group looked like a
"ramshackle operation" without the organization to do any real harm. 306
In short, the trial failed to secure conviction of the terrorist cell because
a terrorist cell was never on trial. The individuals and offenses were
severed from each other, making it impossible for the judge and jury to
see exactly what the offenders had done.
A RICO case would join the defendants and offenses and make a
single trial possible. In prosecuting the ricin case as a hypothetical
RI CO conspiracy, a prosecutor could name the Salafist Group for
Preaching and Combat (GSPC) or al-Qaeda as a RICO enterprise and all
In the ricin case, RICO's
thirteen conspirators as members. 307
he had kept it, he replied "because I'm stupid." Cowan & Duncan, supra note 286. Thus,
jurors were left with the notion that the defendants were essentially harmless when, as the
murder of DC Stephen Oake proved, this was anything but the truth.
302. Pollard, supra note 297. Conversely, the evidence of the ricin plot was put before
the jury in the murder case. Steven Morris, New appeals put anti-terrorism measures to
test, THE GUARDIAN (London), May 19, 2005, at 6.
303. Duncan Campbell & Rosie Cowan, Ricin Plot: Terror Trail that led from Algeria
to London: One Jailed, Four Freed after Jury Deadlocked at end of Eight Month, £20m,
Trial, THE GUARDIAN (London), Apr. 14, 2005, at 8.
304. See Dodd, supra note 302; Last Act of Terror Cell, supra note 264.
305. As a result, the reports of the trial seem to reach the consensus that Bourgass was
"a murderous and inept loner" who acted alone. As one reporter objects:
Who then . . . supplied him with multiple ID papers, activated him, provided safe houses
and taught him to use a knife to kill one and gravely injure three other police officers? And
if Bourgass was acting alone, how come there were four sets of his poison recipes and
fingerprints of several people all over them?
Sean O'Neill, Be Afraid in Your Armchair, TIMES, Apr. 20, 2005, at 18 [hereinafter
Armchair].
306. Campbell & Cowan, supra note 302.
307. A RICO enterprise "includes any individual, partnership, corporation, association,
or other legal entity, and any union or group of individuals associated in fact although not a
legal entity." 18 U.S.C. § 1961 (4) (2006). Naming the Salafist Group for Preaching and
Combat (GSPC) or al-Qaeda as a RICO enterprise, would cast the "enterprise" in the
"perpetrator" role. RICO Enterprise Concept, supra 55, at 656.
Courts have held that this definition includes "wholly illegitimate" organizations. United
States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 584-585 (1981). Furthermore, the Supreme Court in
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enterprise concept would function as a joinder mechanism, allowing
joinder of defendants "employed by or associated with" an enterprise, or
who "conspire[] to violate section 1962(c)."308 A RICO statute tailored
to the needs of a terrorist prosecution could include crimes of violence,
possession or manufacture of poisons, and immigration offenses as
"predicate activity. " 309 Under the language of section 1962(c), if these
offenses are committed by a defendant or another similarly joined to the
enterprise and is committed in the "affairs" of the enterprise, then they
can all be properly joined in a single trial. 310
2.

Overcoming U.K. Objections to Joinder

The suggestion that the liberal joinder of offenses and offenders is
advantageous and even necessary to promote justice faces vehement
opposition in the U.K., where long trials are the problem, not the
solution. 311 The U.K.'s most recent criminal reform project, A Fairer
Deal for Legal Aid, goes so far as proposing a cap on the length of
longer trials and removing the jury from complicated cases. 312 This
National Organization of Women, Inc. v. Scheidler, held that no economic motive was
required to violate RICO. 510 U.S. 249 (1994).
308. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) (2006). See also FED. R. CRIM. P. 8.
309. See 18 U.S.C. § 1961 (1)(2006).
310. 18 U.S.C. §1962 (c); RICO Enterprise Concept, supra note 55, at 654-55. As
shown in Section II above, RICO would allow for the more liberal admission of evidence.
For example, because the "enterprise" is an essential part of making a RICO case, the
prosecution could adduce evidence of the internal structure al-Qaeda or the Salafist Group
for Preaching and Combat (GSPC). See RICO Enterprise Concept, supra note 55. See also
United States v. Salemo, 686 F.2d 534, 536 (2d. Cir. 1987).
In addition to the evidentiary advantages that RICO presents, prosecutors in the U.K. have
an added advantage. The Criminal Justice Act (2003) changed the law with respect to
character evidence, allowing the free admission of previous convictions when those
previous convictions tend to prove a "matter in issue between the defendant and the
prosecution." Criminal Justice Act of 2003, c. 44, § lOl(l)(d) (2003) (U.K.), available at,
http://www.opsi.gov.uk/acts/acts2003/20030044.htm. The act goes on to define a "matter in
issue between the defendant and the prosecution" as the "question whether the defendant
has a propensity to commit offenses of the kind with which he is charged, except where his
having such a propensity makes it no more likely that he is guilty of the offence." Id. § 103
(l)(a). Thus, under the new act, one defendant's past conviction for terrorist offense, would
be admissible.
311. The discussion assumes that, when Lord Woolf wrote, The Standards of Justice
we deliver are no better than 50 years ago, Why?, he was speaking of justice not only as the
speedy resolution of claims but also as the accuracy of those resolutions. See Woolf, supra
note 246. While there is no official report of the ricin case a reading of the news and other
media reveal overwhelming evidence of the defendants' guilt. That much of this evidence
was not put before the jury, or at least not put before the same jury and in a single case,
shows the U .K. trial procedure as actively working against accurate results and justice.
312. DEPARTMENT OF CONSTITUTIONAL AFFAIRS, A FAIRER DEAL FOR LEGAL AID 5.40
(2005), available at http://www.dca.gov.uk/laid/laidfullpaper.pdf (last visited Sept. 27,
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reform was instigated by the bourgeoning £2.1 billion legal aid budget
that the Department of Constitutional Affairs proposes to reduce by
limiting complex cases.
A survey of the longest thirty cases heard between 2003-2004
showed that:
• The average length of these trials was 67 days. 313
• On average, six defendants were tried in these cases. 314
• The average number of prosecution witnesses was 114. 315
The objection to joint trials is not just their length, it also is a
general distrust of a juror's ability to remember the evidence presented
over a longer trial and differentiate between defendants. 31
In the
speech announcing these proposals, Lord Falconer of Thornton QC, the
leader of the reform project, stated "[t]he days of the 18-month trial are
over . . . . Any jury in the world would find it almost impossible to
remember properly what was said 18 months ago. Most cases should
not last longer than a few months." 317
Since the passage of RICO and the advent of the "enterprise trial,"
U.S. courts have had several occasions to examine the policies behind
joinder and larger trials. 318 For the most part, the fears expressed by
Lord Falconer, Lord Woolf, and others are unfounded.
First, joint trials do not necessarily increase the cost of
adjudication. Instead, joinder prevents the unnecessary repetition of
evidence. 319 Not only does this save a prosecutor the time of presenting
evidence twice (at twice the cost), but it also saves the sometimes
This becomes
recalcitrant witness the hassle of reappearing.
particularly important in terrorism cases, where witnesses require
special arrangements to attend trial because they present a security

2006) [hereinafter A FAIRER DEAL FOR LEGAL Arn]; Lord Woolf, supra note 259.
313. AFAIRERDEALFORLEGALAID, supra note 311, at 5.5 .
314. Id.
315. Id.
316. See Frances Gibb, Length and Cost of Trials to be Cut, TIMES (London), May 11,
2005, at 22.
317. Id.
318. See Brendan Judge, Note, No Easy Solutions in the Problem of Criminal Megatrials, 66 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 211 (1990); FEDERAL BAR COUNCIL COMMITTEE ON SECOND
CIRCUIT COURTS, A PROPOSAL CREATED BY EXTREMELY LONG CRIMINAL TRIALS, 128
F.R.D. 137 (1989) [hereinafter FEDERAL BAR COMMITTEE]; Paul Marcus, Prosecuting
White-Collar Crime: Re-Evaluating Large Multiple-Defendant Criminal Prosecutions, 11
WM. & MARY BILL OF RTS. J. 67 (2002).
319. See Zafiro v. United States, 506 U.S. 534, 537 (1993). Additionally, they
"promote efficiency and serve the interest of justice by avoiding scandal and inequity of
inconsistent verdicts." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
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risk. 320 Thus, while the U.K. is seeking to save money from the legal
aid defense budget, any savings it realizes will probably be offset by an
increase in the Crown Prosecution Office's spending and Prison
Services. 321
Second, to say that the jury is unable to perform its function and
differentiate between defendants is both speculative and untrue. 322 Even
in the largest cases, jurors have been able to differentiate between
defendants. For example, in one of the largest cases ever, United States
v. Casamento, the jury heard testimony from more than 275 witnesses
over a seventeen month trial of 31 defendants. 323 Despite the duration
and complexity of the trial, the jury was able to differentiate the
defendants; several were acquitted on the continuing criminal enterprise
charge and one defendant was acquitted on a narcotics charge. 324 This
is not to say that every trial should become a seventeen month affair but
it does illustrate that U.S. juries are able to differentiate between
defendants and recall the content of evidence delivered over a seventeen

320. FEDERAL BAR COMMITTEE, supra note 318, at 138. The report states that:
The government's apparent preference for lengthier joint trials rather than shorter
separate trials is often based on defensible policies, such as the efficiency of one
long trial, a desire to present a full picture of a complex multi-defendant criminal
scheme, an interest in limiting the number of appearances by government witnesses
who may be reluctant to testify at all or whose appearances may present security
problems, or a reluctance to allow the discovery that might be the side effect of
multiple trials.
Id.

321. See e.g., Lord Woolf, supra note 259. He states that "there is no satisfactory
liaison between the courts and the Prison Service or between the police and the Crown
Prosecution Service. Among the consequences were that trials were often interrupted
because of the late arrival of defendants from prison ... and witnesses did not attend court
when required." Id.
322. See G. Robert Blakely, RICO: Federal Experience (Criminal and Civil) and an
Analysis of Attacks Against the Statute, in THE HANDBOOK OF ORGANIZED CRIME IN THE
UNITED STATES 451, 460-67. That RICO makes for long, burdensome trials is a myth. For
example, "an analysis of reported RICO opinions shows that of over 400 opinions that
provided information regarding trial length, only six trials were found to last over six
months. The vast majority (76.4 percent) were shorter than three months." Id. at 460.
While not all RICO charges are quickly resolved, these figures indicate that a RICO trial is
typically not the monstrously long trial the British fear.
A second concern, that juries in complex enterprise trials are confused and use evidence
admitted against one defendant against all defendants. The evidence will have a prejudicial
spill-over effect, and jurors will convict defendants who, in an individual trial, would not
have been convicted. It is not obvious from this claim that the reverse might also be true.
Jurors may acquit a defendant because he appeared comparatively less guilty than a codefendant. In short, "where multiple defendants are on trial, it is .. . at least as likely that
'innocence by comparison' rather than 'guilt by association' will obtain. Id. at 463 .
323. United States v. Casamento, 887 F.2d 1141, 1149 (2d Cir. 1989).
324. Id. at 1151.
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month span. 325
Last, the argument that the U.K. needs a RICO-type statute to
modernize both their substantive and procedural law should not be
dismissed if only for one important reason: RICO is effective. 326 In
1969, the Committee on the Judiciary in the United States Senate issued
a report listing 288 "made members" of the mob, that is, those members
in the highest levels of leadership. 327 In 1988, eighteen years after
RICO's adoption, the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations held a
second set of hearings, this time naming over a thousand known la Cosa
Nostra (LCN) members in all levels of leadership. 328 When comparing
the two lists of members and their resulting convictions and jail time
served, after RICO, more high ranking LCN members were
convicted. 329 Of the LCN members identified in 1969, members served
an average of 46 months in prison over their lifetime, or just under four
years. 330 By contrast, the LCN member identified in the 1988 hearings

325. Indeed the Casamento court itself took issue with the length and complexity of the
trial. On appeal, the Second Circuit affirmed the defendants' convictions but stated that it
had "misgivings about trials of this magnitude." Id. The court went on to issue benchmarks
to district courts facing such large trials. In those cases when a trial is expected to exceed
four months, the prosecutor has the burden of an "especially compelling justification" for
joinder. Id. at 1152. The Judge should "explore" severance with the prosecutor, and
determine if smaller trials of easily ·proven defenses that "carry exposure to adequate
maximum penalties" is more appropriate. Id. See also United States v. Gambino, 729
F.Supp. 954, 970 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (following the Casamento benchmarks and severing a
twelve defendant trial into two groups). But see United States v. Tocco, 200 F.3d 401, 414
(6th Cir. 2000) (declining to follow Casamento benchmarks).
326. See James B. Jacobs & Lauryn P. Gouldin, Costa Nostra: The Final Chapter?, 25
CRIME & JUSTICE 129 (1999).
327. Measure Relating to Organized Crime: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Criminal Laws and Proc. of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary , 91 st Cong. 125 ( 1969).
328. Organized Crime: 25 Years after Valachi: Hearing before the Permanent
Subcomm. on Investigation of the S. Comm. on Governmental Affairs, 1OOth Cong. (1988).
329. To ensure the reliability of data, the only sources in this study were the Committee
Hearings, Lexis Law, and the Historical New York Times. A keyword search was
conducted for each named member in the Federal and State Cases database, All News, and
the New York Times Data Base. Indictments resulting in a trial were noted; indictments not
resulting in a trial were not. The date of sentencing is recorded, if available. In the event it
was not, the date of the first post-trial opinion is recorded. Other data recorded includes
name, date of birth, date of death, cause of death, position in the crime family, and any
known aliases. Through this method the researcher recorded data on the Bonanno family,
one of the 5 major crime families operating in New York City. This study is not exhaustive,
but it does represent a large sample population for comparing convictions and sentences.
330. This is preliminary data obtained for a small size of 140 LCN members of the
Bonanno crime family. Of the 25 Bonanno family members identified in 1969, all but 5
members were charged with a crime in their lifetime. That the high ranking members
served less than four years in prison over their lifetime demonstrates a failure of the law to
secure meaningful convictions that incapacitate criminals. Often these members were
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served an average of 68 months (almost 7 years) for each conviction,
with many members convicted two or three times. 331 Of the members
identified in the 1988 hearings, thirty percent went on to be convicted in
for RICO or a RICO conspiracy. By far, LCN members charged with
RICO violations served the most prison time. Those charged with
RICO, including those charged with a RICO violation who later plea
bargained, served an average of twelve years. 332 Ten percent of those
charged with a RICO violation received a life sentence.
A "well-designed and tried RICO prosecution is a thing of beauty."
It places the racketeering or terrorism activity in context and allows the
jury to see exactly what the defendants have done. For these reasons,
trying the ricin case as a RICO case would be more likely to secure
convictions against the ricin thirteen, that is, to do justice. Passing a
RICO-type statute would serve to update the antiquated U.K. trial
system to more effectively deal with phenomena like terrorism in
modern society. Further, the success of the RICO statute in the U.S.
would not have been as dramatic if not for the wealth of evidence
provided under the requirements of Title III, the wiretap statute. 333 The
U .K.' s inconsistent position on wiretap evidence is justified on the basis
that "a crucial source of counter-terrorist information would dry up if
wire tap evidence were permissible in court."334 Put differently, the
objection is not that wire tapping is not or should not be used in the
U.K.; it is that its use in court would reveal sensitive sources and
methods or, alternatively, provide a powerful deterrent to terrorist from
using the phone. This Article argues that a statute like the Classified
Information Procedures Act, combined with the U.K. 's existing
procedures, would protect sensitive sources and methods, so as not to
reveal how domestic surveillance is done. 335 If used in court, wiretap
charged with crimes like criminal contempt or obstruction of justice that carried minimal
sentences.
331. This data omits numerous life sentences that are still being served and thus cannot
be quantified. Again, this preliminary data was obtained from a 140 person sample of the
Bonanno crime family . Of the 115 members identified in 1988, researchers were able to find
convictions of 71 members. Of these 71 members convicted, 29 were prosecuted several
times, indicating a high (40%) chance of recidivism. Of the 71 convicted, 36 were convicted
for RICO or RICO conspiracy.
332. This data omits RICO trials that are still pending or where the sentence remained
unpublished. The average is far less than RICO's twenty year penalty because a majority
(60%) reportedly plea bargained. The data also omits the three life sentences obtained;
because the sentences are still being served, they cannot be quantified.
333. Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act, Pub. L. No. 90-351, 82 Stat. 212
(1968) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2520 (2006)).
334. 430 PARL. DEB., H.C. (6th ser.) (2005) 1441 (U.K.).
335. Classified Information Procedures Act, Pub. L. No. 96-456, 94 Stat. 2025 (1980)

Published by SURFACE, 2006

65

Syracuse Journal of International Law and Commerce, Vol. 34, No. 1 [2006], Art. 3

106

Syracuse J. Int'I L. & Com.

[Vol. 34:41

evidence would not "dry up," as for several reasons, that has not been
the case in the U.S. experience.
Moreover, wiretap should not be ignored for an additional reason:
it is effective. During 2002, electronic surveillance led to 1,617 arrests
and 2,066 convictions. 336 Wiretap evidence is a particularly important
source of evidence when prosecuting a RICO case. Of the RICO cases
surveyed, 95% of the RICO convictions used electronic surveillance. 337
For all of these reasons, the U .K. should consider amending their
otherwise liberal rules of evidence.
CONCLUSION

Congress enacted the RICO as part of a comprehensive effort to
change the means by which the government attacked enterprise
criminality. The statute makes a single trial of all "siblings" in a crime
"family" possible and appropriate. It permits a judge and jury to
understand exactly what the defendants have done, in a way that the
American and English common law procedural and evidentiary rules
did not.
The success of RICO makes it an appealing model for other
nations' legislation. In late 2004, when the U.K. proposed law
enforcement reforms with respect to organized crime, it looked to
RICO. Nevertheless, its evaluation of the statute is largely innocent of
the procedural and evidentiary considerations involved in effective
prosecution of enterprise criminality. For all of these reasons, the U.K.
should consider updating its trial procedure in order to take advantages
of the procedural advantages a joint trial affords against all forms of
enterprise criminality, including terrorism.

(codified at 18 U.S.C. App. 3, §§ 1-16 (2006)).
336. Director of the Administrative Office of the United States Courts, Report on
Application for Orders Authorizing or Approving the Interception of Wire, Oral, or
(2003),
available
at
Electronic
Communications
5
http://www.uscourts.gov/wiretap03/contents.html (last visited Sept. 26, 2006).
337. Again, this information is preliminary data, found by using the Bonanno crime
family data as the sole source of information. This percentage may even be higher, but due
to limitations in the information available, this is the only percentage that can be stated with
any degree of certainty.

https://surface.syr.edu/jilc/vol34/iss1/3

66

